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Declaratory Judgments in the Federal Courts
HARRY W. VANNEmA * AND DOROTHY G. KUTNER**
A bill is pending in Congress to revise, codify and enact into
law title 28 of the United States Code entitled "Judicial Code and
Judiciary." Chapter 151, sections 2201 and 2202 deal with Declara-
tory Judgments. The following is a copy of the Act of 1934. The
portions omitted by the pending bill are italicized and the changes
and additions are in bold type.
"(1) In case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction
except with respect to Federal Taxes the courts any court
of the United States shall have power upon petition, declaration,
complaint or other appropriate pleadings to declare rights or other
legal relations of any interested party, petitioning for such declara-
tion, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare rights
and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such dec-
laration, whether or not further relief is or could be prayed sought,
and any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final
judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
"(2) Further necessary or proper relief based on a de-
claratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary
or proper. After reasonable notice and hearing, against any ad-
verse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment."
"The application shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction
to grant relief. If the application is decreed sufficient, the court
shall on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights
have been adjudicated by the declaration, to show cause why further
relief should not be granted forthwith."
"(3) When a declaration of right or the granting of further re-
lief based thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact
tryable by jury, such issues may be submitted to a jury in the form
of interrogations, with proper instructions by the court, whether
the general verdict be required or not."
It is manifest that the original act will be greatly shortened and
simplified if the proposal is passed. This accords with the policy
of Congress in this matter. It has been content to pass a simple en-
abling act conferring upon the federal courts jurisdiction to issue
declaratory judgments without the detailed enactment found in the
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Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. It is believed that the proposal,
if it becomes law, will not appreciably modify the procedures that
have been established under the Act of 1934.
The purpose of this article is to consider the work of the federal
courts, chiefly at the trial level, and to ascertain the difficulties met
by those courts in cases brought under the statute. All of the
cases have been examined but only those manifesting difficulties
have been considered herein. The chief difficulties seem to present
themselves in the following topics; Nature of the Remedy, Exercise
of Discretion, the Existence of a Controversy, Jurisdictional Amount
of Controversy, Another Pending Suit, Exhaustion of Statutory
Remedies, and Contingent Interests and their effect on Determina-
tion of a Controversy.
VALIDITY
The frequency of the use and the extent of the scope of the
declaratory judgment procedure in the federal courts today was in
no way indicated by its very stormy, though short, history. Al-
though equity courts had long made use of the technique of a
declaration of the rights of the parties to a controversy under its
consideration,' the Supreme Court manifested a strange opposition
to its use as a form of relief in the federal courts. Requests for
declarations were erroneously treated as petitions for advisory
opinions, or considered as involving hypothetical or moot cases and
hence not within the jurisdiction of federal courts because they
did not satisfy the Constitutional provisions which conferred power
on the courts in cases and controversies only.2  This intolerance
toward the declaratory device was carried to such extremes that
the Supreme Court held that it could not review a case on appeal
from a state court brought under the state declaratory judgment
act.3 In another case it was strongly intimated that a Congressional
act conferring such jurisdiction would be unconstitutional.4
' Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U.S. 533 (1892) and see Mr. Justice Stone's
opinion in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249
(1933).
2U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273
U.S. 70 (1927) ("The sole purpose of the petition... is to obtain a declara-
tion.... There is no semblance of any adverse litigation.").
3 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op Market
Assoc., 276 U.S. 71 (1928) ("This court has no jurisdiction to review a
mere declaratory judgment.").
4Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assoc., 277 U.S. 274 (1928) ("What
the plaintiff asks is simply a declaratory judgment. To grant that is be-
yond the power conferred upon the federal judiciary . . . the proceeding
is not a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the Con-
stitution." In his concurring opinion Stone, J. suggested that this was,
in effect, giving a declaratory judgment.); See also Piedmont & Northern
Ry. v. U.S., 280 U.S. 469 (1930).
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It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the constitutional
problem, now well-settled and elsewhere so fully treated.5 It should
be pointed out, however, that many of the doubts created by this
attitude were resolved in the Wallace case 6 in which the court did
review a declaratory judgment rendered by the state court based
upon the state declaratory judgment statute. In that case the court
found that a genuine "case or controversy" did exist, the presenta-
tion of which, though not in traditional form, was sufficient to
meet the constitutional requirement. Therefore, the court upheld the
validity of the state statute which authorized such an unconven-
tional presentation of the matter. Nevertheless, some doubt seemed
to linger in the minds of some of the judges. This doubt was indi-
cated in 1934, the year that Congress passed the Federal Act author-
izing the use of declaratory judgment procedure, when the Supreme
Court linked such a judgment with an advisory opinion and held it
inadequate to meet the test of a "case or controversy.' 7 Perhaps it
was because of this decision and the dictum contained in the opinion
that the "case or controversy" concept was re-examined with
great care by Chief Justice Hughes in an early case brought under
the new federal statute to test its validity.8 The Haworth case
presented the issue in the form of a request by the insurance com-
pany for a declaration of non-liability under a policy of insurance.
Both the district court and circuit court of appeals found that
"There was only a potential, a possible future controversy, but no
present actual controversy." The Supreme Court reversed the hold-
ing and set at rest, so far as the Federal courts were concerned, the
constitutional question by upholding the validity of the Federal Act.
The court interpreted the phrase, "cases of actual controversy," the
statutory prerequisite for the rendition of a declaratory judgment,
by explaining that "the word 'actual' is one of emphasis rather
than definition. Thus the operation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is procedural only." Since procedural changes are not pro-
hibited by the Constitution, the validity of the act was established.
5 BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, Chapter V (2d ed. 1941); AN-
DERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, Chapter II (1940); Sunderland, Modern
Evolution of Remedial Rights-Declaratory Judgments, 16 MIca L. REV.
69 (1917); Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31
COL. L. REv. 561 (1931).
6 See note 1 supra.
7Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286 (1934) ("This court may not be
called upon to give advisory opinions or to pronounce declaratory judg-
ments.").
8Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
9 11 F. Supp. 1016 (1935), aff'd, 84 F. 2d 695 (C.C.A. 8th 1936).
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NATURE OF THE REMEDY
Under this topic some difficulties are experienced by the courts
in seven somewhat disconnected but related matters. They will be
presented in the following order: sui generis character, the declara-
tion as alternative relief, prohibition against piecemeal determina-
tion of issues, comparison with requirements for injunction, place-
ment of burden of proof, jury trial, and counterclaim for
declaration.
The new declaratory judgment procedure created by the Act
of 1934 is neither equitable nor legal but sui generis. 10 As described
by Rodney, D.J. in a recent case, "A declaratory suit defies any at-
tempt to affix a label indicative of its character as either a legal or an
equitable proceeding . . . It is usually denominated as sui generis
to indicate it is neither purely legal nor purely equitable."1 1  It is
a flexible, adaptable and hybrid form of action whose origin has
been traced to equity practice, most frequently to quia timet cases.
12
But this origin does not stamp the declaratory relief as equitable.
It has been held that, since the declaratory judgment is not a suit in
equity, the absence of an adequate legal remedy is not a prerequisite
to the granting of a declaration, nor do the technicalities of equity
procedure control declaratory judgment suits.13 Because its charac-
ter is procedural, its singular nature does not operate to enlarge
or alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' When further coer-
cive relief of an equitable nature is prayed, equitable principles will
be employed, but if of a legal character, legal principles control.15
One problem which has caused great difference of opinion and
conflict in state decisions is whether the declaratory judgment is an
10 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Vince, 118 F. 2d 232 (C.C.A. 6th 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 637 (1941); Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 107 F. 2d
446 (C.C.A. 9th 1939); Miller v. Greenville, 138 F. 2d 712 (C.C.A.
8th 1943); American Blower Co. v. B. F. Sturtevant Co., 61 F. Supp. 756
(S.D.N.Y. 1945) (Act is procedural. It does not create new substantive
rights in legal relations.).
11Buromine Co. v. Nat. Aluminate Corp., 70 F. Supp. 214 (D. Del.
1947).
12 American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 57 F. Supp. 545 (N.D.
Cal. 1944) quoting American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F. 2d
613 (C.C.A. 7th 1939); Wallace case, note 1 supra.
i3 Bakelite Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Development Co., 34 F. Supp. 142 (D.
Del. 1940); See American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., note 12 supra.
'4See note 12 supra. And see Atlantic Meat Co. v. Reconstruction
Finance Corp., 166 F. 2d 51 (C.C.A. 1st 1948) (The Declaratory Judgment
Act "confers no additional jurisdiction on the district courts but merely
adds a new procedural device.").
' See note 11 supra.
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alternative remedy.16 Most of the federal courts, however, under-
stand and treat the declaratory judgment as another form of relief.
Federal Rule 57 provides that: "The existence of another adequate
remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate."'17 The result has been that the scope of
the new remedy has become practically as broad as the existence
of other remedies.
Because of its alternative status, therefore, a petition for a de-
claration may also include a prayer for further relief from among
the conventional remedies, legal, equitable, or both, in a proper
case.18 It is clear, of course, that additional relief need not be
prayed for; a declaration as a sole remedy is authorized by the
statute.19
However, there are isolated instances where the courts seem-
ingly have trouble with the "alternative" concept of the remedy. A
recent case, in.particular, stands out for the confusing and erroneous
language contained therein, to wit: "The act is not exclusive. It
affords an alternative remedy. It provides a remedy in certain con-
troversies where no other remedy is available."20 This case, decided
in 1935, came early in the history of the federal declaratory act
when the courts were not quite certain of the part to be played
by this new procedural technique. There is no recurrence of this
idea and it is believed that the inexperience of the court with a new
remedy alone accounts for the questionable statements by the court
on its utility.
.Courts have often repeated a warning to litigants that declara-
tory relief is intended as a final determination of issues and should
not be considered as intermediate relief, performing a stop-gap
function. 21 By the same token, they have tried to educate parties to
the realization that a declaration can not be sought for the determi-
nation of some of the issues involved in a controversy, while the
remaining issues are settled with coercive measures. A declaration
of rights is a final adjudication of a controversy, reviewable on
appeal or error, which ranks on a par with a permanent injunction
26 BORcHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 315; and see Breese, Atrocities
of Declaratory Judgment Law, 31 MiNN. L. REv. 575 (1947); Duvall, The
Declaratory Action, 21 TuIAN.F L. Rav. 559 (1946-47).
17 28 U.S.C. page 2644 (1940).
is Miller v. Greenville, note 10 supra.
19 Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F. 2d 327
(C.A.A. 2d 1947); Ginn v. Biddle, 60 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
-°Automotive Equipment v. Trico Products Corp., 11 F. Supp. 292
(W.D. N.Y. 1935).
21 Koon v. Bottolfsen, 60 F. Supp. 316 (D. Idaho 1944); Root v. York
Corp., 56 F. Supp. 288 (D. Del. 1944) (Declaration must be a final judg-
ment); Duart Mfg. Co. v. Philad Co., 31 F. Supp. 548 (D. Del. 1940).
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or a judgment for damages. Undoubtedly, the fact that a declara-
tory judgment is an alternative remedy, which may or may not
/ be granted along with coercive relief, has caused the confusion as to
its availability as a piecemeal determinant.
That a declaration can not be used where it will not terminate
the litigation or bar rights which might thereafter be asserted was
ably pointed out in Koon v. Bottolfsen.22 In that case, plaintiffs,
suing for a declaration of rights under a contract made with de-
fendants as officers of the state, brought an action against the latter
in their individual capacity. The court, in refusing to pass upon
the merits of the case and declare the rights of the parties, stated
that the action, brought against the improperly-named defendants,
could not be maintained. So far as the declaration was concerned,
the court ruled that it "should settle the entire controversy; and that
cannot be accomplished in the present action."
Similarly, a declaration of liability of a surety on a performance
bond, given by a subcontractor to a contractor, was held not to be a
"final judgment" because the primary liability of the subcontrac-
tor to the contractor had not been first determined. 23 Accordingly,
an appeal from such declaration was dismissed as premature, the
court ruling that for a judgment which did not determine all the
issues involved in an action to be considered "final" and appealable
under the Federal Rules, it must make a final disposition of a claim
separate and apart from all other claims involved. Thus, if the
declaration did not settle the "transaction or occurrence" which
was the subject-matter of the declaration, it was not a final de-
claratory judgment but an unorthodox attempt to try a case
piecemeal.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, great flexibility has been
achieved in dealing with this principle. Thus, where a plaintiff,
an accused patent infringer, petitioned for a declaration of the in-
validity of defendant's patent and non-infringement by the plaintiff,
and for an injunction against threatened infringement suits, to
which action the defendant interposed a legal counterclaim for
damages, there were obviously many issues involved. Some were
to be tried by a jury and some by the court. The court, however,
denied a motion for separate trials, saying, "No separate trial is
22See note 21 supra.
23Western Contracting Corp. v. National Surety Corp., 163 F. 2d 456
(C.C.A. 4th 1947) (Judge Parker said, "A declaratory judgment is not
proper for the purpose of determining in advance the validity of defenses
in a pending action or of trying it by piecemeal."); Angell v. Schram, 109
F. 2d 380 (C.C.A. 6th 1940) (Court cannot make a declaration unless it
can settle the controversy); Perlberg v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
62 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (Declaration denied if plaintiff has power
to make it academic.).
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necessary and the court can within its equity power grant the
equitable remedy upon the testimony produced at the jury trial. 2 4
Thus all of the issues would be disposed of and piecemeal adjudica-
tion avoided.
In a case in which a declaration and an additional request for
damages were sought the principle was again approved. The court
found that all claims were dependent upon the declaration con-
cerning a single provision of the contract, which had been made by
the district court but, for a reason not explained, the court had
not yet assessed the damages. It was held that the case was not
appealable because the judgment was not yet final. Reliance was
placed upon the federal rule25 which stresses "the transaction or
occurrence" as the "subject-matter" of the claim, instead of the
legal rights arising therefrom.2 6 The court seemed to be on very
doubtful ground, however, when it suggested that "the mere fact
that different claims are made arising out of this one contractual
provision is not sufficient separation of the 'causes' so that piecemeal
appeal is permissible." This suggestion of "piecemeal appeals," im-
plying the validity of "piecemeal actions," seems to be a direct
refutation of the general prohibition against the latter practice.
Another departure from the rule is illustrated in the desire of
the courts to terminate existing difficulties between the parties
before it. As a result of this attitude, one court held that the fact
that rights which might subsequently accrue could not be deter-
mined in an action for a declaration on an essential matter of con-
struction of a contract did not prevent a present declaration.
2 7
Thus, if the issues are presently determinable, the acceptance of
the case in a declaratory judgment proceeding will give the court
power to settle all issues.
Another case which seems at odds with the usual limitation
surrounding declaratory judgments is one in which the court as-
sumed jurisdiction of all other issues between the parties by virtue
of having acquired jurisdiction over one of the issues.2 8 Whether
this was done under color of avoiding piecemeal litigation was not
pointed out by the court, but if that were the motivating factor,
such a result would amount to a real "stretching" of the rule.
24Ryan Distributing Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943),
aff'd, 147 F. 2d 138 (C.C.A. 3d 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 859 (1944).
?28 U.S.C. Rule 54 (b).
2"6Petrol Corp. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 162 F. 2d 327 (C.C.A.
2d 1947).27Dunleer Co. v. Minter Homes Corp., 33 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. W. Va.
1940).
28 Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Regents of New Mexico College of
Agric. & Mech. Arts, 70 F. Supp. 198 (D. N. Mex. 1945), aff'd, 158 F. 2d 900
(C.C.A. 10th 1947).
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In retrospect, the application of this section has been declared
to be limited to those controversies which can be effectivly encom-
passed and determined in a declaration and judgment either ending
litigation which might otherwise result therefrom or limiting rights
which might thereafter be asserted.
There is evidence of a mistaken view that the jurisdiction of
the federal courts in a declaratory proceeding is in some way con-
ditioned upon and controlled by the same considerations which
govern a court of equity in a suit for a declaration of an equitable
nature. This is particularly noticeable where the equitable remedy
sought is an injunction.
In N. Y. Casualty Co. v. Zwerner,29 where the petition sought
a declaratory judgment in a tax matter, the court said, "The de-
claratory judgment act ... does not bar action by the court in this
case, for it has been held by the United States courts that where
a third party is entitled to an injunction against the Tax Collector,
declaratory relief may also be granted. . . . Furthermore, if the
court has the right to grant an injunction, it also has the right by
declaratory action to determine the rights of the parties." No un-
fortunate result would likely follow this affirmative rule: that the
existence of jurisdiction to issue an injunction is sufficient to sus-
tain the granting of declaratory relief. On the contrary, the al-
ternative character of the remedy is thereby sustained. But when
the opposite, the negative rule, is urged, objection should be noted,
for the results of its application are abortive of the concept that
this declaratory judgment remedy is alternative.
The negative rule was approved in State of Wyoming, v.
Franks,3 0 where the court refused declaratory relief saying: "The
case has been considered primarily under the prayer for injunctive
relief, but if considered under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the
result must be the same. Where an injunction will not lie a de-
claratory judgment cannot be substituted for it. Similarly, in Sellers
v. Johnson3' the court stated the rule thus: "This court cannot de-
termine the rights of the parties by declaratory judgment in a case
where the court must under the situation refuse equitable relief."
Both cases rely upon the Huffman case 32 in which a declaration of
the validity of a state tax was sought. After pointing out the fed-i
eral policy of hesitation to interfere with state taxing and fi;s4J.
matters, Stone, C. J. said: "The Declaratory Judgment Act was
29 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
30 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
31 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946).
3
*
2 Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Beal v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 312 U.S. 45
(1941); Speilman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
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not devised to deprive courts of their equity powers or of their
freedom to withhold relief upon established equitable principles."
He then referred to the Act of Congress in 193733 which forbade dis-
trict courts to enjoin or interfere with any state tax where "a plain
speedy, and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such state." The same considerations, the Chief Justice
maintained, which prompted Congress to limit the district court's
jurisdiction in equity "are persuasive that relief by way of declara-
tory judgment may likewise be withheld in the sound discretion
of the court."
The state law involved in this case had provided a statutory
remedy, which was considered adequate, but had not been ex-
hausted. The court could have denied declaratory relief for that
reason. Justice Stone continued, "For we are of the opinion that
those considerations which have led the federal courts of equity
to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes, save in exceptional
cases, require a like restraint in the use of the declaratory judgment
procedure."
It seems clear that the Huffman case does not hold that the de-
claratory judgment remedy is not an alternative remedy to the
granting of injunctive relief. Nor does it stipulate that the avail-
ability of an injunction is a prerequisite to the existence of juris-
diction for a declaratory action. However, the opinion should be
interpreted as meaning that, once jurisdiction of a declaratory
action has been established, the same considerations of policy
against interference with the operation of a state law, which obtain
in a suit for an injunction, should prevail in an action for a declara-
tion.
In the recent case, Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vil-
lage,8 4 in which it was decided that the case was hypothetical and
not ripe for a declaration, there is language which may suggest
the objectionable negative rule. Justice Frankfurter said: ". . . as
we have seen, the Bank's grievance is too remote and insubstantial,
too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board
of Governors, and therefore equally inappropriate for a declaration
of rights." It is believed that what is meant is that the same con-
siderations of policy will control the declaration as control the
issuance of an injunction, not that the declaration is dependent
upon the existence of injunctive relief.
The Franks and Sellers cases above seem to be stating the rule
so as to make the applicability of injunctive relief a requirement
for the assumption of jurisdiction, thereby attacking the character
of a declaration as an alternative remedy, a concept firmly estab-
3350 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1) (1940).
3468 Sup. Ct. 641 (1948).
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lished in the federal courts. The rule should recognize the declara-
tory remedy as an adaptable alternative form of relief based upon
the exercise of sound discretion controlled by constitutional princi-
ples and established rules of policy.
Some difficulty has been experienced by several of the courts
on the placing of the burden of proof in declaratory judgment ac-
tions. Because of the negative character of many petitions, such
as requests for declaration of non-liability, non-infringement etc.,
and the frequent reversal of the position of the parties, confusion
easily has resulted. The majority of the courts, which have had
to consider this phase of the problem, however, have adhered
strictly to the ordinary rule which places the burden on the party
asserting the affirmative of the issue.3'
Conflicting views are found in cases presenting the question
of the burden of proof of allegations of jurisdictional facts. In one
case the court held that the party asserting the jurisdiction of the
district court had the burden of supporting his allegations of the
jurisdictional fact with competent proof when those allegations
were challenged. 6 This holding follows the usual rule. However,
in another case, in which the defendant denied plaintiff's allegation
of diversity of citizenship, which was the basis for the court's juris-
diction, it was held that the defendant had to bear the burden of
proof.3 Such a conflict cannot be resolved.
A more serious problem has presented itself in suits involving
declarations of patent infringement. This problem has been epi-
tomized in Hunt v. Mallinckroot38 where the plaintiff, an accused
infringer, brought suit for a declaration of both the invalidity of
defendant's patent and non-infringement thereof by the plaintiff.
The defendant's answer set up a counterclaim for injunction and
damages, alleging infringement. The court said: "It would be in-
cumbent upon defendant to offer testimony to substantiate its alle-
35 Thompson v. B. & 0. R. Co., 59 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Mo. 1945), modi-
fied on other grounds, 155 F. 2d 767 (C.C.A. 8th 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 762 (1946); Angell v. Schram, 109 F. 2d 380 (C.C.A. 6th 1940); Stand-
ard Accident Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 55 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Ill. 1944) (Insurer
had burden of proof on issue of waiver by insured of right to refund of
unearned premium, insurer filed for declaratory judgment of non-liability);
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McIver, 27 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
aff'd, 110 F. 2d 323 (C.C.A. 9th 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 655 (1940);
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, 25 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ore. 1938); Inter-
national Hotel Co. v. Libbey, 158 F. 2d 717 (C.C.A 7th 1946) (Burden or
plaintiff though suit for declaration.).
"I Williams v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 131 F. 2d 601 (C.C.A
5th 1942).
3TBuilders & Manufacturers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp
858 (D. Me. 1938).
38 72 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. N.Y. 1947).
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gations of infringment; failing which it could not recover the decree
which it seeks. It follows that the burden of proof upon such issues
rests with it." The court in this case relied upon Professor Bor-
chard's statement: 30 "Since as a rule the risk of non-persuasion is
on the plaintiff it is not surprising to find that the burden of proof
in declaratory actions rests, in a vast majority of cases on the mov-
ing party. Yet, as we shall see, the peculiar nature of a suit for a
declaration of non-liability may shift the burden to the defendant,
the party who originally made the charge or claim, such as patent
infringment, which is the basis of the action for declaration of non-
liability."
The same question of placing the burden exists in insurance
cases in which the insurer petitions for a declaration of non-liability
on a disability policy on the ground that the insured was not perma-
nently and totally disabled as claimed. In such a situation the
burden of proof was held to rest -on the defendant to show the
claimed disability.40 Hence, it is not true that the burden is always
on the plaintiff. Where the insurer asked for a declaration of non-
liability for double indemnity because the insured did not die acci-
dentally but committed suicide, the court held that the burden of
proving operative and affirmative facts was upon him who relied
upon them.-' In this case this meant that the burden of proving
accidental death was upon the administrator of the deceased's estate.
Erroneous statements by a court respecting the burden of proof,
however, are not always reversible error. Where the issue of the
continued disability of the insured was tried by a court without a
jury the fact that the judge incorrectly stated that the burden was
upon the insurer did not require the reversal of a judgment for the
defendants.4 2 The court's reason for so holding was grounded on
the fact that the judge's opinion and findings of fact indicated that
he was firmly convinced that all of the evidence the defendants
had offered established the fact that the insured was totally dis-
abled.
The present statute makes specific provision for jury trial of
issues of fact. The courts have no quarrel with this provision nor
do they encounter difficulty in its application, inasmuch as issues
of fact are tried in declaratory actions, as elsewhere, in accordance
with the Constitution and the general principles and statutory reg-
39BORCHARD, op cit. supra note 5 at 404.
40Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tormohlen, 118 F. 2d 163 (C,C.A. 7th 1941).
4' Reliance Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F. 2d 234 (C.AA. 8th 1940), re-
hearing denied, 311 U.S. 730 (1940).42See note 40 supra.
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ulations governing trial by jury. 3 If the action is of a legal char-
acter a jury may be demanded as of right unless waived. Such a
verdict is given the full recognition accorded common law verdicts
and not treated as purely advisory. On the other hand, the advisory
jury of a court of equity may be utilized in a declaratory proceed-
ing which raises equitable factual issues, subject to the same con-
ditions and with like results as an advisory verdict in equity.
The proposed revision" of the Judicial Code and Judiciary
omits all provisions respecting jury trial. It is believed that this
change is without significance for the reason that the rules of pro-
cedure which govern the federal courts generally will control in
the declaratory judgment procedure, whether mentioned in the
statute or not. The change seems a proper one to make; it shortens
and simplifies the act.
Professor Borchard has pointed out that one of the evils grow-
ing out of patent monopolies was the ability of the patentee to
harass alleged infringers with threats of suits. Then, once suit had
been brought, and before a trial thereon, he would move to dismiss,
leaving the defendant without an adjudication either of non-
infringement or of patent validity.4 5 After the passage of the Declar-
atory Judgment Act it was possible for the defendant to file a
counterclaim for a declaration on these same issues, thereby avoid-
ing the dangers of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. The question has
arisen in many patent cases as to whether this was a proper tech-
nique by which to avoid the continuance of the insecurity produced
by a dismissal of the patentee's action. A few cases have held that
it was not proper and dismissed the counterclaim along with the
main action. 6 But the great weight of authority supports the view
that the alleged infringer may secure the determination of the
4 Piedmont Fire Ins. Co. v. Aaron, 138 F. 2d 732 (C.C.A. 4th 1943);
Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F. 2d 225 (C.C.A. 10th 1942); Ryan
Distributing Corp. v. Caley, note 24 supra; Great Northern Life Ins. Co.
v. Vince, note 10 supra; Pacific Indemnity Co. v. McDonald, note 35 supra.
4 See introductory paragraphs of this article.
-- BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 812, and the numerous cases cited.
See also Aralac Inc. v. Hat Corp. of Amer. 166 F. 2d 286, 291 (C.C.A. 3d
1948) ("Prior to the passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act the
patentee was the only one in a position to initiate a suit against the al-
leged infringer or his dealers. An alleged infringer could not sue the
patentee for a declaration that the plaintiff was not infringing or that the
patent was invalid." The act gives him his place in the sun.).
46 Oblak v. Armour & Co., 1 F.R.D. 648 (W.D. Mo. 1941). See other
cases taking this view in BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 45. (Some com-
mentators consider this a fatal blow to the protection afforded the alleged
infringers by the new declaratory procedure.); See 50 HARVARD L. REv. 357
(1936).
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issues of infringement and validity of the patent by a proper
counterclaim.47
A recent case 48 supports this view as follows: "There is a real
controversy .. . between the parties here. True they have pre-
sented the issue by complaint and answer. But, obviously, upon
trial, the District Court may finally dispose of the dispute by find-
ing merely that there has been no infringement, leaving the ques-
tion of invalidity wholly undetermined. The defendant may not
be satisfied with a judgment of non-infringement. It asserts, and
must be deemed to have, a substantial interest in the adjudication
of non-validity. Clearly, it might file an independent suit seeking
a declaratory judgment. Rather than follow this procedure it has
interposed, we think with propriety, a counterclaim seeking the
same relief.... We see no reason why it should not be available
to him as a counterclaim when circumstances would have permitted
a separate suit." Accordingly, it seems entirely proper, at least in
patent cases, to prevent a miscarriage of justice through an exer-
cise by the plaintiff of the power to dismiss the main suit. The test
of the sufficiency of a counterclaim is whether the facts pleaded
show a need for affirmative relief for the defendant. Where such
is the case, an adjudication of the issues presented by the counter-
claim declaring the rights of the parties is both necessary and
proper.
DISCRETION
In granting or withholding relief under the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, the district court exercises a discretion not dissimilar
to that obtaining in a court of equity. Although the statute does
not, in specific terms, grant discretionary authority, Borchard, the
draftsman of the federal act who prepared the Senate Committee
Report thereon, commenting in his treatise on the absence of such
a provision said: "Nor does the fact that the Report of the Judiciary
Committee of the Senate makes no direct reference to the discre-
tionary exercise of the power granted by the Federal Act militate
against the rule of discretion."49 He goes on to state that the pro-
vision authorizing the exercise of discretion was written into,'the
Uniform Act so it could guide the state courts in its administration,
but that a desire to keep the federal act short and concise necessi-
tated the inclusion of only indispensable provisions. Accordingly,
although discretion was not specifically mentioned, there was no
intention to deny its use. In fact the Committee Note under Fed-
4 7 BORCEARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 813.
" Trico Products Co. v. Anderson Co., 147 F. 2d 721 (C.C.A. 7th 1945).
See also Kohloff v. Ford Motor Co., 29 F. Supp. 843 (D.C. 1939), aff'd, 124
F. 2d 1018 (C.C.A. 2d 1941).
4 9 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 312.
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eral Rule 57 expressly provided that the uniform act be a guide
for the scope and function of the federal act. This position was
fortified by the language in an earlier circuit court decision" to
the effect that the use of discretion is implied from the fact that
the act merely gives the court power to grant the remedy without
prescribing the conditions under which it is to be granted. It could
hardly be supposed that it was intended that relief should be
granted as of course in every case where a controversy existed.
The courts have readily accepted the proposition that the de-
cision, to accept jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment case in-
volves an exercise of a sound discretion. As a matter of fact, this
policy of the courts was expressed in a recent case: "The discretion
to grant or refuse declaratory relief should be liberally exercised
to effectuate the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act and
thereby afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status and other legal relations."51
Before such discretion may be exercised, however, the proper
groundwork for the granting of a declaration must have been laid.
This includes both the existence of all jurisdictional and procedural
prerequisites5 2 of justiciability and the finding by the court that
a declaratory judgment will terminate the controversy and serve a
useful purpose. Thus the courts' use of discretion has been ex-
panded gradually whenever they have been persuaded of the use-
fulness of a declaration. This attitude of the courts has been re-
flected in the change of emphasis from that of form to one of sub-
stance and policy, focusing upon the need and desirability of the
declaratory judgment.
Any attempt at regulation by rule, standard or criteria of the
court's exercise of its discretion is more or less futile because dis-
cretion ends where regulation begins. Standards established by a
50Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 4th
1937).
51 Lehigh Coal & Nay. Co. v. Central Ry. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362, 365
(E.D. Pa. 1940); see also Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, note
34 supra. ("A declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief,
should be granted only as a matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the
public interest .... It is always the duty of the court of equity to strike
a proper balance between the needs of the plaintiff and the consequences
of giving the required relief.").
52Aralac Inc. v. Hat Corporation of Amer., note 45 supra, (Murphy, J.,
"The conditions of the usual action, procedural and substantive, must al-
ways be present, namely, the competence or jurisdiction of the court over
parties and subject matter, the existence of operative facts justifying the
judicial declaration of legal consequences, the assertion against an inter-
ested party of rights capable of judicial protection, and a significant legal
interest in the moving party to entitle him to invoke a judgment in his
behalf.").
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court for the determination of the case before it may be inapplicable
to the next case under consideration. A test set up by one court is
not elevated to the same position of importance by another court
in the consideration of a similar fact pattern. Such is the nature
of "discretion."
It is possible, however, to list certain criteria most frequently
found in court opinions indicative of the sort of considerations
which guide them in their decisions: (1) that the declaratory judg-
ment will or will not serve a useful purpose, either because another
action is pending between the same parties and involving the same
issues, or the declaration would only give a piecemeal determina-
tion of the issues, or there is really no actual controversy; (2) that
there is involved in such a declaration an interpretation of or an
interference with a state law;53 (3) that the considerations of
"convenience, expediency, need, desirability, public interest or
policy" are frequently favorable to or against the declaration;54 (4)
that injunctive relief is or is not available;5 (5) that another
remedy is or is not more effective, 6 under the circumstances, or a
statutory remedy is provided and has not been exhausted;5 7 and
(6) utility, rather than necessity, is the proper test.5 8 There are
other criteria in the cases but this list is sufficient to indicate those
most frequently used by the federal courts.
The discretion employed by the courts in the decision of declar-
atory judgment cases has been described as a judicial discretion
hardened by experience into a rule by which it is hoped that ar-
bitrary action may be excluded as fully as possible. At best, how-
ever, the personal judgment of the trial court is very much in the
decision. For this reason the matter of discretion is subject to
review by the circuit court of appeals. Of necessity, therefore,
in reviewing the decision of the district court to grant or refuse
the declaratory judgment the appellate court must substitute its
judgment for that of the lower court, if an abuse of discretion has
been found. Such a result is the natural concomitant of a review
of this nature. Too much reliance, of course, must not be placed
upon the district court's decision, otherwise the declaratory judg-
ment remedy would be abused. For this reason it is desirable
53 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
50,BORCHA D, op. cit. supra note 5.
so Sellers v. Johnson, 69 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Iowa 1946). And see cases
cited in notes 29 to 33 supra.
56 Hillsborough Twp., Somerset County, N. J. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620
(1946).
57 Emmons v. Smitt, 58 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1944), aff'd, 149 F. 2d
869 (C.C.A. 6th 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 746 (1946).
58James v. Alderton Dock Yards, 256 N.Y. 298, 176 N.E. 401 (1931).
59 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, Inc., 101 F. 2d
514 (C.C.A. 3d 1938).
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that a court, basing its determination on the exercise of its discre-
tion, state the reasons which induce its application. Unhappily, too
few cases reveal the exact reasons inducing the court's action in
this respect. Consequently, it is not surprising that a very small
number of cases are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTROVERSY AND
THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
As stated above the statutory requisite for a declaratory judg-
ment is the existence of an actual controversy. The requirement is
clear and universally recognized but the courts encounter consider-
able difficulty in its application to certain fact patterns. The differ-
ence between an abstract question and an actual controversy is
one of degree and opinions differ when a concrete case pattern is
presented. Basically, the question is whether the alleged facts
present a substantial controversy between the parties having ad-
verse legal interests of such reality and immediacy as to warrant a
declaratory judgment. One court thought that the word "actual"
in the statute had been construed so liberally that in effect it had
been eliminated practically from the statute.6 1 But Chief Justice
Hughes had previously stated that it was a word of emphasis
only.12
Professor Borchard has stated the criteria for the guidance of
the court in determining whether an actual controversy has been
made out by a petition: "The opposition to the plaintiff's demand
must come from a source competent legally to jeopardize his right.
Where, however, that is conceded, it still remains to determine
whether the plaintiff has a sufficient interest, pecuniary or per-
sonal, to institute a proceeding worthy of judicial relief. He must
show that his rights are in direct issue or jeopardy; and incidental
thereto must show that the facts are sufficiently complete, mature,
proximate and ripe to place him in gear with his adversary, and
thus to warrant the grant of judicial relief. Just when the con-
troversy has reached the stage of maturity cannot be a priori de-
fined.' 6 3 This criterion was approved by Judge Yankwich in a case
in which the benefits of the declaratory judgment were allowed
"even before a right of action existed or a cause of action accrues."6 4
The application of this rule is necessary in all declaratory ac-
6
oCrowell v. Baker Oil Tools, 49 F. Supp. 552 (S.D. Cal. 1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 143 F. 2d 1003 (C.C.A. 9th 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 760
(1944).
61 Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. American Anode Inc., 137 F. 2d 6D
(C.C.A. 3d 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943).62 Aetna Life Ins .Co. v. Haworth, note 8 supra.
63 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 36.
64 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hubbard, 22 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
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tions, but for the purpose of indicating its difficulties, a sampling of
cases has been taken from four classes of cases: patent cases, con-
tract cases, cases involving statutory questions and/or administra-
tive orders, and cases involving contemporary problems of the
seniority status of veterans.
In the eleven patent cases selected to illustrate the determina-
tion of a justiciable controversy, seven found such to exist and four
dismissed the petitions. In one of the cases dismissed, wherein the
court found that the proof failed to show any adequate charge of
infringement by the owner of the patent, it was held that an actual
controversy did not exist until the patentee made some unequivocal
claim that his patent had been infringed. 5 A suit for infringement
would clearly be sufficient to establish a cause of action for a de-
claratory judgment. But some question exists whether notice of
infringement would suffice. A very liberal view on this point was
taken in a case in which the defendant by letter, prior to declara-
tory judgment suit, stated that plaintiff's advertising seemed to have
"many of the ear-marks" of defendant's patent, and asked for
further details from which to determine the infringement contro-
versy. This correspondence was prolonged and finally defendant
proposed a license to use his patent, stating that the plaintiff's prod-
uct would infringe his patent. To the plaintiff's suit for a declara-
tion of non-infringement the defendant objected that there was no
controversy. The court ruled that simple, informal notice of in-
fringement is sufficient, and that the correspondence was enough.
Otherwise, the defendant could "sit back and take no action till
the plaintiff had gone to much trouble and expense in making and
putting its product on the market. ' 66 This uncertainty, which the
plaintiff must feel, would seem to be precisely the sort of thing the
act was intended to resolve by a declaration, and the court was
right in finding that a controversy existed.6 7
A case decided the next year, however, is much more exacting
in the matter of the sufficiency of the notice. During the war the
defendant had permitted the use of certain patents for military
and naval purpose without payment of royalties. Plaintiff requested
65 Thermo-Plastics Corp. v. International Pulverizing Corp., 42 F.
Supp. 408 (D. N.J. 1941).
66 General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp., 65 F. Supp. 75
(W.D. N.Y. 1946).
67Accord: U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals
Corp., 49 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. N.Y. 1943), cert. granted, 314 U.S. 603 (1941);
Petersime Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 43 F. Supp. 446 (S.D.
Ohio 1942), aff'd, 135 F. 2d 580 (C.C.A. 6th 1943), appeal dismissed, 320
U.S. 805 (1943); Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Ziegler, 151 F. 2d 784
(C.C.A. 3d 1945); Randolph Laboratories Inc. v. Specialties Development
Corp., 62 F. Supp. 897 (D. N.J. 1945).
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a declaration of non-infringement and alleged that a cause arose
by virtue of defendant's advertisements in trade journals which
stated, "Now that the war is ended, we hereby give public notice
that we expect no use will hereafter be made of any of our patents
except by individuals or concerns duly licensed thereunder." Al-
though the court recognized the frequent need for relief from the
patent "racket" which the declaratory judgment act afforded and
that the liberal construction employed by the federal courts was
entirely correct, yet relief was denied.68 It was decided that where
the controversy was based upon notice that it was necessary to
establish and follow some "norm," "criteria" or "yardstick" by
which the character of the notice might be gauged. This require-
ment was not satisfied, inasmuch as the advertisement failed to
identify any particular patent owned by defendant as being in-
fringed, nor was any particular infringement on the part of the
plaintiff identified, nor was any particular product of the defend-
ants indicated as in danger and, finally, no actual infringement was
charged by any one. In short, the notice lacked particulars and
was inadequate as a basis for an "actual controversy." Likewise,
where a patentee gave notice to users of articles made under his
patent of the termination of licenses to producers of the product,
of whom the plaintiff was one, and that thereafter the patentee
would furnish the articles, it was held insufficient notice to support
the plaintiff's petition for a declaration of non-infringement.6 9 Al-
though the concept of a controversy is somewhat technical, it is
believed that these last two cases place an unwarranted limitation
on the liberal use of declaratory judgments in an area in which its
use should be encouraged and for a reason and with respect to a
matter in which a more liberal view would not endanger the prop-
erty of patent holders nor create an abuse of the declaratory remedy.
During the period of the war emergency, often at the suggestion
of a government official, declaratory judgment actions were not
pressed, although an actual controversy existed, in order to avoid
interference with war production. For example, at the request of
the Secretary of the Navy a petition for a declaration of patent
infringement was dismissed. Since the emergency relative to war
production has passed, such actions have been permitted, indicating
that a cause did exist. 0 Similarly, covenants not to sue for patent
infringement, accepted on the recommendation of the Petroleum
68 Federal Telephone & Radio Corp. v. Associated Tel. & Tel. Co., 71
F. Supp. 877 (D. Del. 1947).
09Hart v. Recordgraph Corp., 73 F. Supp. 146 (D. Del. 1947).
70 Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 66 F. Supp. 893 (D. Del. 1946),
Tev'd on other grounds, 122 F. 2d 925 (C.C.A. 3d 1941).
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Coordinator, ended with war termination and the revocation of
recommendation.". Thereafter, declaratory suits were sustained.
Thus, both liberal and conservative attitudes can be seen in
the application of the rule in patent cases.
Contract cases reveal the same diversity of attitude in the fed-
eral courts in the matter of the determination of the existence of
an actual controversy. In a case which seems to go to the verge
of the law, but is believed to be correctly decided, the plaintiff and
the defendant were parties to a contract by which they embarked
upon a house construction adventure in which they were to share
profits and losses. Defendant repudiated the entire contract and
denied liability for accrued losses. Plaintiff petitioned for a declara-
tion that the contract was valid, that the agreement consisted of
several divisible contracts and that suits for losses already incurred
would not bar subsequent suits for future losses, which the peti-
tion alleged would be incurred. The court sustained the action on
the ground that the request was for an adjudication of plaintiff's
rights on existing facts and not for an advisory opinion on hypo-
thetical facts contingent on future events." Likewise, a request for
a declaration that the award of a construction contract be restrained
or, if awarded, that further proceedings thereunder be prohibited,
was entertained, the court finding an actual controversy rather than
a moot question because the contract was so nearly completed.7 3
This liberal view is reflected in cases in which there is far less doubt
than in the two cases discussed where the decision was so close 
On March 15, 1948 the United States Supreme Court handed down
a decision in the case of Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village,
Cal.,7 5 which is particularly startling in the light of the view just
presented. The Bank in this case had been granted membership in
the Federal Reserve System. A condition was imposed for the pur-
pose of protecting the Bank's independence, however, by which
the Board of Governors was empowered to withdraw the member-
ship if the Trans-American Corporation, a powerful bank holding
corporation, acquired an interest in the Bank without the approval
of the Board. The Trans-American Corporation did acquire 540 of
the 5000 shares of the Bank. The Board found, however, after in-
vestigation, that this acquisition of shares was a mere investment,
1Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shell Development Co., 64 F. Supp. 806
(D. Del. 1946).72Dunleer v. Minter Homes Corp., 33 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. W. Va. 1940).
73Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, 156 F. 2d 914 (C.C.A. 5th 1946).7 4Humphrey v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 38 F. Supp. 224 (D. Ore.
1940); Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Central RR. of N.J., 33 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Pa. 1940); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shell Development Co., note 71
.-supra.
7 See note 51 supra.
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that the independence of the Bank was undisturbed, and, accord-
ingly, disavowed any intention of revoking the membership be-
cause of the condition broken. The Bank filed a petition in the dis-
trict court for a declaration that the condition imposed was illegal,
unwarranted and ultra vires and asked that it be cancelled. The
district court, in line with the liberal view, sustained the petition
and ruled that an actual controversy was presented.7 6 The Bank's
need for a declaration was thus dramatically expressed: "In view
of the events that have transpired, the condition hangs over the
bank like the sword of Damocles ready to strike whenever the
Board of Governors chooses to wield the weapon at its command.
In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Altvater v. Freeman, 319
U. S. 359, 365 ... It was the function of the Declaratory Judgment
Act to afford relief against such peril and insecurity." The District
Court further stated that plaintiff was not posing a hypothetical
question and that until the validity of the condition was decided,
great uncertainty and insecurity would perplex the plaintiff in all
its business plans for the future. It was concluded that "To say
that no actual controversy exists between the parties is not real-
istic." The circuit court of appeals"7 affirmed the district court,
one judge dissenting, on the ground that an actual controversy ex-
isted. These decisions were reversed by the Supreme Court in a
five to two decision, two justices dissenting and two not participat-
ing.
After pointing out that a declaratory judgment was a matter
of judicial discretion exercised in the public interest, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion of the court, said "Courts
should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief is clear,
not remote or speculative." The court indicated that the Bank's
rights were secure unless its independence were lost, and the Board
of Directors changed its policy and the Federal Depositors' Insur-
ance Corporation discontinued its policy, which events were
thought to be unlikely. The opinion continued: "The occurrence of
these contingent events, necessary for injury to be realized is too
speculative to warrant anticipatory judicial determination. Courts
should avoid passing on questions of public law even short of con-
stitutionality that are not immediately pressing. . . . As we have
seen, the Bank's grievance here is too remote and insubstantial,
too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board
of Governors, and therefore, equally inappropriate for a declaration
of rights." This controversy was held not yet ripe for a declaratory
judgment and it was ruled that the lower courts should have dis-
missed the petition.
76 64 F. Supp. 811 (D. D.C. 1946).
7 161 F. 2d 636 (App. D.C. 1947).
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Justices Reed and Burton dissented for reasons similar to those
announced by the lower courts. It was thought important that the
Board of Governors had in no way manifested an intent never to
impose the condition. Justice Reed declared: "Certainly, as I see
it, there is not only the possibility of future injury but a present
injury by reason of the threat to the marketability of respondent's
stock.... It requires no elaboration to convince me that the threat
is a real and substantial interference by allegedly illegal govern-
mental action."
It is believed that there was an actual controversy presented
by the Bank's petition which was ripe for a declaration. An alleged
illegal power in an administrative tribunal which creates uncer-
tainties and disturbs the petitioner's rights should come before the
court as readily as a similar unlawful action on the part of a private
person. Indeed, the facts seemed peculiarly suited to declaratory
treatment by which the uncertainties could be removed without
further coercive procedure.
The conflict in the cases on the question of the existence of an
actual controversy where statutory provisions are involved seems
even sharper and more irreconcilable than in the patent and con-
tract cases. In a case where labor difficulties arose between sugar
producers and their employees because of conflicting contentions
with regard to the applicability of the wages and hour provisions
of an Act of Congress, it was held that a justiciable controversy
existed and a declaratory judgment petition was proper to deter-
mine whether Congress intended to exempt such employees from
the act."' But, contrariwise, it was held that a justiciable contro-
versy did not exist for the purpose of determining whether an Act
of Congress which prohibited the plaintiff, a corporation created
under the act, from engaging in the insurance business also pre-
vented its owning stock in companies engaged in such business.7 9
Since the defendant had threatened to bring suit to revoke the
plaintiff's certificate of incorporation because of its ownership of
said stock, it seems very clear that a ripe controversy existed. One
judge dissented on this ground from the opinion of the court dis-
missing the petition. It is difficult to understand why, in a question
of the applicability of a statute which was present in both cases, one
court should recognize the existence of a controversy while the
other did not.
In Connecticut Importing Co. v. Perkins,"' a wholesaler filed
a petition for a declaratory judgment against the Secretary of Labor,
78 Bowie v. Gonzalez, 117 F. 2d 11 (C.C.A. 1st 1941).
79Smith v. American Asiatic Underwriters, 127 F. 2d 754 (C.C.A. 9th
1942), approved, 134 F. 2d 233 (1943).
8035 F. Supp. 414 (D. Conn. 1940).
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Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department
of Labor, the State Commissioner of Labor and U. S. District At-
torney for Connecticut, respecting the applicability of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to his employees. The petition alleged that
the Wages and Hours Division of the Department of Labor had pub-
lished an "Interpretative Bulletin" in which it was declared that
wholesalers buying goods from outside their state should comply
with the act. The petition further stated that the defendants had
investigated the problem and told the plaintiff that he was engaged
in interstate commerce and liable for the penalties imposed for the
violation of the act. It was held that the petition presented no
justiciable controversy because the defendants lacked the authority
to prosecute the wholesaler for failure to comply with the act. This
seems a very questionable decision but certainly the following
statement by the court is unwarranted: "Nor can I find in the
complaint unequivocal allegation that the District Attorney has
threatened to prosecute the plaintiff, or indeed has taken any defi-
nite position in the premises." It seems preferable to assume that
the prosecutor would perform his duty if the plaintiff violated the
statute and that the unanimous character of the advice received,
that the act did apply to him, was sufficient to create a controversy
which a declaration could finally resolve.
Where a regional director of the wage and hour law informed
an employer that the latter's practices were violating the act and
must cease, and further stated that he was designated by employees
to start proceedings, an actual controversy existed which justified
a declaratory proceeding. 1 There are many cases where similar
factors obtain in which a liberal attitude is manifested by the
courts.8 2
Seniority rights were created by the United States Selective
Service Act by which an employee taken into the armed services,
upon honorable discharge therefrom, was entitled to be restored to
his former position with full seniority privileges. Union labor con-
tracts made during the war and the period of scarcity of labor like-
wise contained seniority provisions. It was inevitable that conflicts
and issues difficult of solution would arise out of this situation for
veterans, civilian employees, employers and the courts. Several
cases in which attempts were made to settle such issues by declara-
tory judgments have been selected as representative of the .problem.
S1 A. H. Belo Corp. v. Street, 35 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Tex. 1940), cert.
granted, 314 U.S. 601 (1941).
82Roloff v. Perdue, 33 F. Supp. 513 (N.D. Iowa 1940); Kentucky
Natural Gas Corp. v. Public Service Comm., 28 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Ky.
1939), aff'd, 119 F. 2d 417 (C.C.A. 6th 1941); Mester v. U.S., 70 F. Supp. 118
(E.D. N.Y. 1947), aff'd, 68 S. Ct. 70 (1948).
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In two of these cases relief was denied, evidencing an attitude op-
posed to a liberal use of declaratory judgment action.
In the Nemenz case 3 the court took jurisdiction and entered a
declaration petitioned for by an employer. The employer here
was faced with a dilemma: either (1) to adopt a policy favoring
the veteran employee in conformity with the compulsory provisions
of the Selective Service Act and nullify the union contracts made
with non-veteran employees, or (2) to proceed on the principle
that the binding force of the union contract was unaffected by the
Selective Service Act. He did not have jobs for both groups of
employees, and between them he was neutral. Suits were threat-
ened. Consequently, both veteran and non-veteran employees who
made demands upon him were joined as parties to the declaratory
judgment action. It was held that these facts presented an actual
controversy and that the court had jurisdiction. (The declaration,,
incidentally, gave preference to the veteran.) It would be difficult
to find a fact pattern more suited to this type of remedy. The court
stated that: "It definitely was the intention of the Federal Declara-
tory Judgment Act and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure that a matter of this nature would be governed thereby." It
was a justiciable controversy and not hypothetical or advisory in
character.
Nevertheless, in a later case decided the same year, and involv-
ing similar facts, the court dismissed the petition of the employer.8 4
He had sued first on the basis of the Selective Service Act but later
amended the petition, and proceeded under the declaratory judg-
ment act. The court ruled that the relief asked was the same and
denied it upon the ground that under the Selective Service Act
jurisdiction was conferred only "upon the filing of a motion, peti-
tion or other appropriate pleading by the person entitled to the
benefits of such provisions," such benefits having been reserved ex-
clusively to returned veterans. It is submitted that such a narrow
view tends to undermine the very purpose of the declaratory judg-
ment act. Although the plaintiff misconceived his remedy initially,
nevertheless, when he brought suit under the declaratory judgment
act to determine a fact controversy growing out of and involving
the Selective Service Act, the refusal of the courts to appreciate
the existence of a controversy and retain jurisdiction is strange in-
deed. The Nemenz case presents the sounder view.
Even when a veteran has brought an action to have declared
his seniority rights under the Selective Service Act, the courts have
been unduly conservative in their interpretation of the facts and
83 Lord Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
S 4Trailmobile Co. v. International Union, 67 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Ohio
1946).
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technical in laying down requirements essential to a good pleading
of these facts. Thus, the court refused jurisdiction because of the
non-existence of a controversy where the plaintiff alleged no more
than that defendant's business was falling off and that since more
and more drivers, of which the plaintiff was one, were being put
on an "extra board," he might be seriously injured by a delay in
determining his seniority status 5 These allegations were held in-
sufficient. Of course the court is correct in its position that "If the
plaintiff is merely in doubt as to his rights under the statute, with-
out having had them challenged, the case is premature and not
properly the subject of a declaratory judgment." However, threats
to rights are sufficient to set a declaratory action in motion. Thus,
where the attorney of the employer declared that they had more
drivers than could be used, and that conditions were growing worse,
such an admission by the defendant would seem to necessitate the
finding of an immediacy of danger sufficient to justify the use of
declaratory procedure. Although this admission was not pleaded,
the court doubted its sufficiency even if included. The court then
proceeded to outline the essentials of the pleadings in such a case.
Facts, it said, should have been pleaded showing threatened loss of
employment as a result of the denial of plaintiff's claimed seniority;
or allegations should have been made that other employees wrong-
fully claimed seniority superior to that of the plaintiff; that a lay-off
of employees was imminent and that irreparable loss would be suf-
fered unless the seniority rights were established. A liberal con-
struction of the petition would have found some of these essentials,
enough it is believed, to make a case.
Declaratory relief is to a considerable extent anticipatory, often
permitted prior to the existence of a cause of action for a wrong,
a point ignored by the court. A complaint should be upheld if the
danger is certain and definite, and it is believed it was so in this
case. The court may have been entirely right in its position, how-
ever, that there was a failure to join all the necessary parties. In
retrospect, however, it can be seen that the utility of declaratory
relief has been considerably hampered in this area of seniority
rights.
In general, it may be said that the attitude taken by the individ-
ual courts conditions, to a large extent, the finding by the court
that a controversy exists between the parties to an action before
it. The standard is broad - "that a controversy exists." Hence, there
is room for interpretation, and the liberal or the narrow view of
each court, therefore, is determinative of its findings.
When the circumstances giving rise to a controversy have
-1 Johnson v. Interstate Transit Lines, 163 F. 2d 125 (C.C.A. 10th
1947).
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been changed by events subsequent to the institution of suit so as
to negative to a large extent the existence of a controversy, most of
the courts have held that such an alteration in the fact pattern
does not necessarily render the case moot. This is so because there
are usually some issues left requiring solution which would justify
the retention of the case and a final, regular, judicial disposal of it.
Exception to this is, of course, found in those instances where the
controversy has been completely resolved and the plaintiff is will-
ing to dismiss.
Patent cases wherein a patentee has charged the plaintiff with
infringement and threatened suit therefor afford the best examples
of this problem. These cases 8 have usually followed this sequence
of events: (1) suit brought by the accused infringer for a declara-
tion of invalidity and non-infringement, and (2) a subsequent con-
clusion and statement by the defendant to such suit that the plain-
tiff's device is not an infringement. In such situations it has been
held that the actual controversy over validity and infringement
still existed. One court expressed its opinion on such a turn of
events thus, "If the defendant were permitted to change his mind
on the question of infringement after this action was commenced,
and avoid a judgment on the issue of validity, nothing would
prevent a switch again to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in-
fringing after the action was dismissed.'87  Thus, once a con-
troversy has arisen, the defendant cannot withdraw his claim of
infringement and defeat a declaration. The plaintiff is vitally in-
terested in procuring a declaration of validity. 8 So too, the fact
that the plaintiff's plant was closed at the time defendant secured
his patent and notified the plaintiff that operations by the latter
would infringe his patent did not prevent a declaration of invalidity
or non-infringement where the plaintiff intended to reopen his
plant.89
A contrary view is found in McCurrach v. Cheney Brothers.
There the court's jurisdiction of an action to declare defendant's
patent invalid and not infringed by the plaintiff was denied because
86Water Hammer Arrester Corp. v. Tower, 66 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.
Wis. 1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 806 (1947), rehearing denied, 330 U.S.
853 (1947); White v. Bruce Co., 62 F. Supp. 577 (D. Del. 1945), aff'd,
162 F. 2d 304 (C.C.A. 3d 1947); Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Intercherical Corp.,
325 U.S. 327 (1945).8 7 Water Hammer Arrester Corp. v. Tower, note 86 supra.
88White v. Bruce Co., note 86 supra; Sinclair & Carroll Co. v.
Interchemical Co., note 86 supra (Where patent suits arise the better prac-
tice is for court to inquire fully into validity thereof.).
89 U. S. Industrial Chemical Inc., v. Carbide & Carbon Corp., 67 F.
Supp. 895 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
90152 F. 2d 365 (C.C.A. 2d 1945).
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"at the trial the defendant expressly disclaimed any claim that the
plaintiff infringed its patent, and there was no room thereafter for
a declaratory judgment as to invalidity:" The concurring judge was
unwilling to rest the decision on the vague abstraction of jurisdic-
tion, which is an unwise limitation on this useful remedial device,
and suggested, instead, that it rest on "grounds of discretion and
lack of utility." This, it is true, is less objectionable. Notwithstand-
ing, it would seem that a mere declaration by a defendant of his
change of mind would rarely call for the dismissal of an action in
the exercise of a sound discretion because, as indicated above, there
are still controversies and uncertainties existing which should keep
the case on the docket until a declaration has settled them.
Another illustration of the rule is found in a case of a declara-
tory judgment and injunction proceeding against a School Board
for discriminatory practices in fixing salary schedules for white and
colored teachers.9 1 The subsequent adjustment of salaries by the
Board did not deprive the court of jurisdiction, although it did cause
postponement of the injunction, inasmuch as the court was doubtful
whether the deep-seated discriminatory "policy, custom and usage"
complained of had been abandoned.
Similarly, the voluntary discontinuance of alleged violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act did not deprive the court of juris-
diction of a suit for the declaration of violation and infringement.2
The danger of future violations suggested the advisability of a
present declaration.
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
The requirements established by law for the assumption of
jurisdiction over a case or controversy by the federal courts exist
alike for declaratory judgment suits and for the conventional ac-
tions. Thus, jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship93
presents no problem in declaratory judgment actions not found in
other suits. But since the law has been settled that a request for
a declaration of non-liability or non-coverage constitutes a contro-
versy, several suits involving insurance contracts have raised the
question of the sufficiency of the jurisdictional amount involved
and the factors to be considered in determining such amount.
There is practical unanimity in the view that, where the action
does not'bring into question the validity of the policy, and the
91 Morris (Hibbler, Intervener) v. Williams, 149 F. 2d 703 (C.C.A. 8th
1945). And see Thompson v. Gibbes, 60 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. S.C. 1945).
92Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consol. Min. Co., 152 F. 2d 812 (C.C.A.
9th 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 803 (1946) ("Voluntary discontinuance of
an alleged illegal activity does not operate to remove a case from the ambit
of judicial power.").
03 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1940).
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declaration is limited to disability or accident liability, that only
benefits which have already accrued to the insured under the policy
may be considered for purposes of satisfying the jurisdictional re-
quirement. 4 In the Greenfield case,95 where a declaration was
sought respecting the company's liability for disability payments,
it was contended that future benefit payments based upon the in-
sured's life expectancy plus the reserve which the company was
required by law to maintain, in addition to the amount of the
premiums that would be waived, could all be combined to make up
the required jurisdictional amount. This was denied. The court
refused to consider more than the amounts already accrued for the
reason that the disability complained of might be terminated at any
time. Hence, since the amount of accrued benefits recoverable at
the time of suit was only $515.35 plus a reasonable attorney's fee,
the jurisdictional requirement of an amount in controversy exceed-
ing $3,000 was not satisfied and jurisdiction over the controversy by
the federal court was refused. Similarly, in the Fowles case,8
where the insured was seeking a declaration as to his disability
benefit rights, he wished to add to accrued benefits, admittedly in-
adequate, the right to future benefits. Only accrued benefits were
allowed and the suit failed because, as the judge said, "Obviously
no right to such 'future benefits' existed at the time action was com-
menced. No one, at that time, knew or could have known whether
such a right would ever exist. Therefore, as to such 'future bene-
fits,' there was and could have been, at that time, no controversy."
An apparently inconsistent view is taken by the Kortz case.9 T
The language of the opinion seems to indicate a consideration of the
anticipated future benefits to be paid in addition to those already
accrued. In that case the amount of the accrued benefits of which
the insurance company sought to be relieved exceeded $3,000. That
alone would have been sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional amount
required. In spite of that, the Circuit Court continued: "Moreover,
the controversy involves more than alleged liability for matured in-
stallments. The Insurance Company seeks an adjudication that will
relieve it from both matured and future disability payments. Since
Kortz's life expectancy is 11.68 years, the amount involved, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, is far in excess of $3,000." It is the quoted
(I Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 154 F. 2d 950 (C.C.A. 5th 1946);
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, 154 F. 2d 953 (C.C.A. 5th 1946); Commer-
cial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fowles, 154 F. 2d 884 (C.C.A. 9th 1946); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Moyle, 116 F. 2d 434 (C.C.A. 4th 1940); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Wechsler, 34 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Fla. 1940).
95 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenfield, note 94 supra.
9 See note 94 supra.
11 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Kortz, 151 F. 2d 582 (C.C.A. 10th
1945).
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language above which raises the question of the existence of a con-
flict on the issue of including future benefits in the computation of
the amount in controversy. Although dictum, it might mistakenly
be considered authoritative.
Not infrequently an insurer petitions for a declaratory judg-
ment to establish the existence or absence of a duty under the policy
to defend a suit brought by an injured party against the insured.
No question respecting the validity of the policy is involved in such
an action, but a suit of this nature poses a difficult question of
evaluating the duty to defend. It has been held that the fact that
the amount of recovery which might be realized is presently unde-
termined does not defeat jurisdiction 8 if the possibility of the in-
surer's liability exceeds $3000.99 This is so regardless of the amount
of the claim being made under the policy. Other courts have held
that the jurisdictional amount is not the face of the policy but the
expense of defending the suit.100 A better criterion would seem to
be the maximum liability under the policy to which the insurer
might be subjected."' It is quite clear that the amount demanded
by the injured party is not material.1 2
There is a suggestion of a more liberal policy in Stoner v. New
York Life Insurance Company.' The company sought a declara-
tion of its non-liability on a disability policy and a cessation of its
duty to waive further premium payments. It was held that under
the circumstances of the case a declaratory judgment could not be
entered, but that it was proper to deny insured's motion to dismiss
for want of the necessary amount in controversy "since a judgment
in favor of respondent would determine petitioner's claim to both
benefit payments and waiver of premiums." The latter, therefore,
could seemingly be added to accrued benefits to make up the juris-
dictional amount. This is a future element. The holding of the
district court in Travelers Insurance Company v. Wechsler'0 4 indi-
cates that similar consideration might be given by the courts to
factors of a less immediate character. There the court said "in the
absence of an admission that the insured has a total and permanent
9SAmerican General Ins. Co. v. Booze, 146 F. 2d 329 (C.C.A. 9th
1944); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Woody, 47 F. Supp. 327 (D. N.J. 1942).
99 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, 18 F. Supp. 450 (D. N.J. 1937).
100 See Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 23 F. Supp. 807 (N.D.
Tex. 1938), aff'd, 103 F. 2d 500 (C.C.A. 5th 1939); State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Hugee, 32 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. S.C. 1940), aff'd, 115 F. 2d 298
(C.C.A. 4th 1940).
101 Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Woody, note 98 supra.
102 Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174 (S.D.
Tex. 1935); C. E. Carnes & Co. v. Employers' Liability Assur, Corp., 101
F. 2d 739 (C.C.A. 5th 1939).
103311 U.S. 464 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 713 (1941).
104 34 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Fla. 1940).
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disability,--the amount of the disability benefits of the policy could
not be computed according to the age and life expectancy of the
insured so as to reveal an amount in controversy in excess of $3000."
This language also carries the implication that if the pleadings
showed an admission of permanent disability, future benefits, based
on life expectancy, could be counted in computing the jurisdictional
amount. Thus this and the Stoner and Kortz cases, supra, bring
under the scrutiny of the courts elements which, in the strict sense
of words, are not in immediate controversy but of future concern.
Where the declaratory judgment petition puts in issue the
validity of the policy itself, as in a request for a declaration of non-
coverage of the policy or non-liability of the insurer, the rule is
well-settled that the jurisdictional amount in controversy is the
face value of the policy.' Consequently, it may be seen that the
distinction between those cases which do not attack the validity of
the policy and those which do is significant. 10 6 Furthermore, where
several insurers have a common interest arising from the coverage
of the same risk, it is sometimes possible to combine the face values
of several policies issued by these different insurers to determine
the amount in controversy.'
0 7
The same rule obtains in contracts other than insurance con-
tracts. The jurisdictional amount is determined by the value of the
contract. The fact situations can not be categorized as neatly as the
numerous insurance cases, but a careful analysis will disclose the
use of the same rule, i.e. the value of the contract.
0 8
The declaratory judgment procedure is sometimes used to se-
105 Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Trotter, 130 F. 2d 800 (C.C.A. 8th 1942);
Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 92 F. 2d 406 (C.C.A. 4th
1937) (Unpaid disability benefits cannot be considered in determining
jurisdictional amounts.); Builders and Manufacturers Mut. Casualty Co. v.
Paquette, 21 F. Supp. 858 (S.D. Me. 1938); New Century Casualty Co. v.
Chase, 39 F. Supp. 768 (D. W. Va. 1941) (Allegation of jurisdictional
amount in controversy is taken as true if not denied in the answer.).
106 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moyle, 116 F. 2d 434 (C.C.A. 4th 1940)
(Excellent opinion by Judge Parker.).
07 Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Crandall Horse Co., 47 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.
N.Y. 1942) (Each policy contained a pro rata liability clause.).
108Davis v. American Foundry Equipment Co., 94 F. 2d 441 (C.C.A.
7th 1938) (Value of the contract exceeded $3000 although present recovery
was less. Jurisdictional requirement satisfied.); American Type Founders
v. Lanston Monotype Mach. Co., 45 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1942), aff'd, 137
F. 2d 728 (C.C.A. 3d 1943) (Present accrued royalties satisfied require-
ment. Future rights could be considered.); Corcoran v. Royal Develop-
ment Co., 121 F. 2d 957 (C.C.A. 2d 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 691 (1941)
(Holder of participating contracts issued by a corporation seeks declara-
tion of rights to be paid prior to shareholders. Aggregate amount of such
contracts constitutes the jurisdictional amount, but such was only $1400
and jurisdiction was denied.)
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cure a declaration of the validity, construction, or application of a
statute. Here, as elsewhere, the jurisdictional requirements must
be met. Accordingly, where a foreign corporation filed a complaint
for a declaration that a statute of Florida was inapplicable to it, it
was alleged that the value of its right to do business in that state,
unregulated, was in excess of $3000. The jurisdictional amount was
satisfactorily established.10 9 Similarly, where the State of Wyoming
sought the construction of a Federal statute which it alleged was
depriving the state of revenues in excess of $3000, the court retained
the case.110 On the other hand, where the plaintiff failed to register
under the Selective Service Act and sought a declaration and in-
junction against criminal prosecution therefor, alleging damages to
him greatly in excess of $3000, including loss of salary, loss of con-
sortium and pleasures of home, it was held that such items were
not properly determinative of the jurisdictional amount,,
Where the petitioner in a declaratory judgment proceeding sued
for himself and "all persons similarly situated," it was held that the
jurisdictional amount must be satisfied by computations based upon
the petitioner's rights alone, as he was the only party. The value
of the rights of the others may not be included."2
ANOTHER PENDING ACTION
In numereous cases a petition for a declaratory judgment is filed
in a district court when a suit is already pending in another federal
or in a state court. As elsewhere, the general criterion set up by the
courts themselves as determinative of their assumption of juris-
diction is whether the declaratory remedy will serve a useful
purpose. Where a suit for a declaration is brought after an action
has been instituted in another court, at least four additional, self-
imposed considerations present themselves as tests for the taking
of jurisdiction of the later action. The criteria which the courts
follow are these: (1) are the same issues involved in both suits;
(2) are the same parties involved in both actions; (3) is there an
equal facility for the trial of the issues in the first action as in the
declaratory judgment action; and (4) is the declaratory action
brought for the bona fide purpose of determining the controversy or
merely to anticipate defenses and enable the defendant to select the
tribunal.
As simple of application as these criteria appear to be on their
face, discrepancies exist therein. Thus, the courts do not agree
109 United Enterprises v. Dubey, 128 F. 2d 843 (C.C.A. 5th 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 669 (1942).
110 State of Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, (D. Wyo. 1945).
-1 Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. Ore. 1940).
112 Southern Pac. Co. v. McAdoo, 82 F. 2d 121 (C.C.A. 9th 1936).
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upon what constitutes the "same issue." This is particularly evident
in insurance and patent cases.
Cases in many jurisdictions treat an action by an insurer for a
declaratory judgment to determine his rights and obligations under
an insurance policy or to declare the termination or cancellation of
the policy as one which involves issues separate and distinct from
those arising in pending suits against the insured by a third party
for personal injuries.18 Thus, the courts have distinguished the
actions on the ground that either: the issue in the state personal
injury action was that of liability under specific circumstances while
that in the federal suit was the status of the policy as void ab
initio;11 or that the liability of the insured was at issue in the state
court whereas the extent of the insurer's liability was the concern
of the declaratory action; "8 or that the suit by the administrator of
the injured party's estate against the administrator of insured's
estate did not present the issues of whether proper notice had been
given the insurer and whether the insurer was under a duty to de-
fend the state court action."- One court, faced with a similar
problem, held that the pendency of an action in a state court which
involved some of the transactions implicit in the declaratory judg-
ment suit did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction of the
insurer's suit unless the identical issues were before the state
court.
11.7
In conflict with these decisions is the case of American Auto-
mobile Insurance Company v. Freundt"8 where the court refused
jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment suit brought by an insurer
to determine his obligations and liabilities under the policy while
the injured party was pursuing a judgment obtained in a state court
against the insured by filing garnishment proceedings against the
insurer. Jurisdiction over the declaratory action was refused on
the ground that the question could be adjudicated in the pending
I's American General lis. Co. v. Booze, 146 F. 2d 329 (C.C.A. 9th
1944); Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Davis, 136 F. 2d 71 (C.C.A. 3d 1943);
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow Co., 39 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. N.Y.
1941), af'd, 125 F. 2d 462 (C.C.A. 2d 1942); General Acc. Fire & Life As-
sur. Corp., Ltd. v. Morgan, 33 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. N.Y. 1940); American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Busch, 22 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Builders &
Manufacturers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Paquette, 21 F. Supp. 858 (D. Me. 1938).
", Builders & Manufacturers Mut. Casualty Co. v. Paquette, note 113
supra.
115 Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Davis, note 113 supra.
11 General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Morgan, note 113 supra.
"7 American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Busch, note 113 supra.
118 103 F. 2d 613 (C.C.A. 7th 1939).
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state court suit, the court relying heavily on its discretionary powers
to entertain or refuse jurisdiction in such a situation."19
Other insurance cases present similar problems. Thus, in one
case the court held that a suit brought by an insurer against his
insured in a state court to cancel the policy and recover benefits paid
out to the insured thereunder presented different issues from those
involved in a federal action instituted the same day by the insured
against his insurer to affirm the validity of the policy.120 Likewise,
the circuit court of appeals held in Guardian Life Insurance Com-
pany of America v. Kortz 2 . that the pendency of an action in the
state court, brought by the insured to recover unpaid disability
benefits, did not bar the assumption of jurisdiction by the federal
court over an action by the insurer seeking to be relieved of both
accrued and future liability for disability benefits. Here the court
stated: "The causes of action asserted are not the same. In the state
court actions, Kortz seeks recovery of accrued disability benefits.
In the declaratory judgment actions, the insurance company seeks
an adjudication that the contract is terminated and seeks relief from
matured, as well as future, liability for disability benefits." How-
ever, the court in this case goes farther: "Moreover, the state court
actions and the declaratory judgment actions are in personam. It
is well settled that where two actions involving the same cause of
action are pending in a state and a federal court, and are within
the concurrent jurisdiction of each, both actions, insofar as they
seek relief in personam, may proceed at the same time and when
one action has gone to final judgment may be set up as a bar in the
other action under the doctrine of res judicata." And then, "The
question should be resolved by a determination of whether there is
such a plain, adequate, speedy remedy afforded by the insurance
company in the pending state court actions that a declaratory judg-
ment will serve no useful purpose." The language of the court on
this aspect of the matter is very disturbing. Certainly a major prob-
lem faced by the courts, where two suits are pending between the
same parties, is the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. Conse-
quently, this attitude of the court, to let the suit first decided act as
res judicata for the one still pending, is alarming. However, there
seems to be room for such a practice under the law as it stands, for
Federal Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states: "An action
for a declaratory judgment, if otherwise appropriate, should not be
dismissed merely on the ground that another remedy is available,
',' Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marr, 21 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Okl. 1937),
aff'd, 98 F. 2d 973 (C.C.A. 10th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 652 (1938).
120 Rydstrom v. Mass. Accident Co., 25 F. Supp. 359 (D. Md. 1938).
121 See note 97 supra.
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nor because of the pendency of another suit, if the issues in the
declaratory action will not necessarily be determined in that suit."
Similarly, the courts are in conflict where two cases involving
patent issues between the same parties are pending in different
courts. Actions for patent infringement are distinguished by some
of the courts from actions for the declaration of the validity of a
patent. Other cases hold that there is a similarity between the
issues which precludes an adjudication by the second court. Thus,
where the state court action was based upon unfair competition,
the district court declared that such a suit did not warrant a con-
clusion that no controversy over the validity and infringement of
the patents existed, which latter points were the subject of suit in-
stituted in the federal court.122 So too, where defendants sued for
infringement of their patents in one proceeding, claiming plaintiff
was its licensee and that the license agreement was valid and sub-
sisting, such an action was held not to bar a declaratory action
brought by the plaintiffs which raised questions under the patent
statutes exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
notwithstanding that each action raised substantially the same
issues. -
Conversely, however, where plaintiff sued for patent infringe-
ment by the defendant, defendant's answer thereto, asking a de-
claration on the validity of the patent in question was dismissed, the
court holding that the validity question would be determined as an
incident to the infringement adjudication and that no useful pur-
pose could be served by entering a declaration on the validity of
the patent."-4
Generally speaking, the courts have little difficulty in interpret-
ing and applying the test that declaratory actions will not be enter-
tained where the same parties to one action are the parties to the
suit for a declaration. On a few occasions, however, the courts have
been bothered by its application to a particular fact pattern.
Especially has this been so where a parent corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary are concerned. 12
In one case the subsidiary brought an action in one district
court to declare its prior right to the use of a trademark and to en-
join defendant's infringement thereof. Shortly thereafter, defend-
ant sued both parent and subsidiary in another district, court alleg-
ing infringement by them. Thereupon, the parent corporation
1'Pomerantz v. Jean Vivaudou Co., 65 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
13 Lionel Corp. v. De Filippis, 11 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. N.Y. 1935).
1-t Cheney Co. v. Cunningham, 29 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
125 Cresta Blanca Wine Co. Inc., v. Eastern Wine Corp., 143 F. 2d 1012
(C.C.A. 2d 1944); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Dictograph Products Co., 66 F.
Supp. 473 (D. Del. 1946).
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sought leave to intervene in the first action and moved to stay the
second action until entry of a final judgment in the first. The court,
refusing leave to the parent to intervene, granted the requested stay
of prosecution of the second action against the subsidiary alone
pending final disposition of the first suit, saying there was no abuse
of discretion in denying a stay of defendant's action against the
parent corporation inasmuch as the parent corporation was not a
party to the first suit and "the duty to enjoin the prosecution of a
proceeding later instituted in another federal district arises only ff
the controversy in each court involves the same issues and the same
parties."12 6
A decision which indicates the court's practical approach to the
problem in which a parent and wholly-owned subsidiary were in-
volved was Zenith Radio Corporation v. Dictograph Products Com-
pany.1 27 There the court refused to restrain the prosecution of the
later-instituted action against the parent until the prior suit termi-
nated in a decree, inasmuch as the earlier suit was considered in-
sufficiently developed for the court to determine that the parent
corporation was undertaking the defense of its subsidiary in such
action. Accordingly, the court, after finding the existence of all
elements requisite to the rendition of a declaratory judgment, re-
frained from acting thereon because "the question remains whether
the present case and the New York case are between the same
parties."
A third consideration adopted by the courts as a test for the
assumption of jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action where
another action is pending is the availability of an equal facility of
trial of the issues in the first action as in the second.128 "Facility"
has been variously described by the courts to include such things
as the nature of the defenses available, the convenience of the
parties and of the witnesses, the adequacy of the remedies afforded,
the position of the case on the docket and the cost of litigation.
120 Cresta Blanca Wine Co. v. Eastern Wine Corp., note 125 supra.
'a-, See note 125 supra.
128 Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. U.S. Industrial Chemicals,
140 F. 2d 47 (C.C.A. 4th 1944); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Kortz,
note 97 supra; Western Electric Co. v. Hammond, 135 F. 2d 283 (C.C.A. 1st
1943); Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 130 F. 2d 474
(C.C.A. 3d 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942); Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Quarles, 92 F. 2d 321 (C.C.A. 4th 1937); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Roe,
22 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. Ark. 1938), rev'd on other grounds, 102 F 2d 28
(C.C.A. 8th 1939); Staley Elevator Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 35 F. Supp.
778 (D. N.J. 1940); Greer v. Scearce, 53 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1944);
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Henderson, 63 F. Supp. 347 (N.D. Ga. 1945);
Buffalo Creek Co-op State Grazing Dist. v. Anderson, 72 F. Supp. 330 (D.
Mont. 1947).
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Thus the Supreme Court of the United States depicted the
factors to be considered by the courts by its dicta in the often-
quoted Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company case: 129 "Ordinarily
it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious, for a federal court
to proceed in a declaratory judgment suit where another suit is
pending in a state court presenting the same issues, not governed
by federal law, between the same parties. Gratuitous interference
with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a state court
litigation should be avoided .... Where a district court is presented
with a claim such as was made here, it should ascertain whether
the questions in controversy between the parties to the federal suit,
and which are not foreclosed under the applicable substantive law,
can better be settled in the proceeding pending in the state court.
This may entail inquiry into the scope of the pending state court
proceeding and the nature of defenses open there. The federal
court may have to consider whether the claims of all parties in
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated m that proceeding,
whether necessary parties have been joined, whether such parties
are amenable to process in that proceding, etc... This was a matter
for determination, certainly, in the first instance by the District
Court."
The prohibition against the use of declaratory judgment proced-
ure as a device to anticipate trial of an issue in a court of coordinate
jurisdiction' 0 or as a means of determining the validity of a de-
fense13 has been frequently voiced by the courts. Similarly, they
have decried the abuse of declaratory procedure by defendants who
have attempted to employ it as a tool to select the tribunal before
which they prefer to appear.
Because of the nature of the problems involved and the fact
that the discretion of the court plays such a large part in their solu-
tion, little more can be said respecting the cases discussed above.
The decision is not an easy and clear-cut one for the trial court. It
may be ventured that a reading of these cases leaves one with an
uneasy feeling that a judge who desires to restrict the use of de-
claratory judgments may utilize this discretionary power as a means
of achieving that purpose. There is more indication of this in the
earlier cases under the Act than in those of recent years. Such an
impression has been produced by the increasing numbers of courts
which have, with slight variation, indulged in the blanket general-
129 316 U.S. 491 (1942) (The same criticism on basis of economy can
be made of the Kortz case, note 97 supra.).
130 Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. U. S Industrial Chemicals,
note 128 supra.
131Aetna Casualty .& Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 99 F. 2d 665 (C.C.A. 4th
1938).
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ization that: "The pendency of another action is not enough to de-
feat the jurisdiction of a federal court whose jurisdiction has been
properly invoked."'132
EXHAUSTION OF SPECIAL STATUTORY REMEDIES
Where, by legislation, special tribunals, commissions or ad-
ministrative boards have been set up and procedural routines
established, courts of general jurisdiction have refrained from en-
croaching upon this special jurisdiction through the declaratory
judgment device. A very persuasive reason for this attitude has
been that a great deal of technical factual investigation is incident
to the work of these quasi-judicial bodies and that they have be-
come experts especially equipped for the work. But this should not
be taken to mean that the administrative method in such cases is
necessarily exclusive, nor that this aspect of the problem is just a
rehashing of the problem of the establishment of the alternative
character of the remedy. 3 " Rather, it is a consideration of those
controversies for which a specific remedy has been provided by
statute, despite the existence of which, different relief, in the form
of a declaratory judgment, has been asked. Some of the courts, it is
found, have required the parties to follow the statutory procedure,
while others have permitted the parties the use of the declaratory
technique.
In general, it may be said, that the discretion of the court ad-
judicating upon the issues plays a large part in the determination
of the matter. As Professor Borchard has said: "If the question is
one of law or of the jurisdiction of the commission it may be
judicial economy and wisdom to decide the issue by declaration
before the administrative channel has been invoked or ex-
hausted.' 134 The usual criterion followed by the courts in deciding
whether to retain or dismiss petitions for declaratory judgments,
however, is whether the remedy alternative to declaratory relief is
an adequate one, that is, whether it is "plain, speedy and efficient."
For the sake of clarity of analysis, the various cases considered
herein have been subdivided according to the substantive fields of
law indicated by their fact situations. The categories, therefore, are
those of tax cases, cases involving contract rights, citizenship dis-
putes, racial and/or religious discrimination controversies, problems
involving the constitutionality or validity of a statute or administra-
132 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marr, note 119 supra; Greer v. Scearce,
note 128 supra; Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America v. Kortz, note 97 supra;
Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., note 128 supra; U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Koch, 102 F. 2d 288 (C.C.A. 3d 1939).
133 See "Nature of the Remedy" supra, page 2],2.
134 BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 344.
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tive order, corporate problems and problems involving federal ad-
ministrative agencies.
It has always been a delicate question when a federal court has
been asked to interfere with the fiscal policy of a state. An Act of
Congress has provided that jurisdiction will not lie in "any suit to
enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax imposed by or pursuant to the laws of any state where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such state.' 135 While there has been some question, 86 it is
now well settled that the Declaratory Judgment Act is included in
this restrictive legislation. 137 While a great majority of the petitions
for a declaratory judgment in tax cases were denied because special
tax tribunals existed in the states and because the special remedy
provided was considered "plain, speedy and efficient,"' 8 several
cases retained jurisdiction and granted a declaration.8 9 Where the
state law provided a means for recovering taxes paid, the remedy
was considered sufficient.140
However, decisions which have followed the "plain, speedy and
efficient" standard indicate considerable variance in interpretation.
For example, in Bucklin Coal Mining case,' 4 1 upon the plaintiff's
assertion that the state procedure was inadequate because it did not
provide for an injunction pending final adjudication and required
four hearings as compared with two under the Federal Declaratory
135 Johnson Act. 28 U.S.C.A. §41 (1) (1937).
136 Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 35 F. Supp.
553 (D. Wyo. 1940).
137 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 46 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1942),
aff'd, 1938 F. 2d 320 (C.C.A. 9th 1943); BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 5, at
808.
188West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, supra note 137; Miller v. City
of Greenville, 138 F. 2d 712 (C.C.A. 8th 1943); Inland Milling Co. v. Huston,
11 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Iowa 1935); Selser v. City of Stuart, 135 F. 2d 211,
(C.C.A. 5th 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 769 (1943); (Quo warranto was
only proper remedy as attack on tax levy was attack on city's corporate ex-
instence.); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman 319 U.S. 293 (1943);
Paul Smith Construction Co. v. Buscaglia, 140 F. 2d 900 (C.C.A. 1st 1944);
Bucklin Coal Mining Co. v. Unemployment Comm., 53 F. Supp. 484 (W.D.
Mo. 1943); Collier Advertising Service v. City of N.Y., 32 F. Supp. 870
(S.D. N.Y. 1940).
189 Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); Morri-
son-Knudsen Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra note 136; Texas
Electric Ry. v. Eastus, 25 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. Tex. 1938), af'd, 308 U.S. 512
(1939), rehearing denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939); Spector Motor Service v.
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); U.S. v. Query, 37 F. Supp. 972 (E.D. S.C.
1941), aff'd, 121 F. 2d 631 (C.C.A. 4th 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 685
(1941), vacated on other grounds, 316 U.S. 653 (1942), vacated on other
grounds, 316 U.S. 486 (1942).
149 Miller v. City of Greenville, supra note 138.
'
41 See note 138 supra.
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Judgment Act and because the matter of supersedeas was left en-
tirely to the commission, the court dismissed the petition, declaring
that the state procedure met the standard. On the other hand, in the
Hillsborough case,142 the state remedy was held inadequate and the
petition retained. The court said, "We have held where a federal
constitutional question turns upon the interpretation of local law
and the local law is in doubt, the proper procedure is for the federal
court to hold the case until a definite determination of the local
law can be made by the state courts .... In the present case it
appears that the respondent's opportunity to appeal to the State
Board of Tax Appeals had expired before the District Court ruled
on the motion to dismiss. And it is not clear that today respondent
has open an adequate remedy in the New Jersey Courts for chal-
lenging the assessments on local law grounds." Thus, in spite of
the policy against interference with state taxes, the federal court
did retain jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment.
In Selser v. City of Stuart1 3 the court did not apply the stan-
dard usually used but seemed to hold that, since the suit "was a
collateral attack upon the City of Stuart," quo warranto was the
exclusive remedy. This was not a suit to enjoin the collection of
taxes-but was thought to go much further. This decision is open
to question, however, on the ground that it tends to subvert the
alternative character of the declaratory judgment remedy.
The construction of contracts and the determination of rights
thereunder has been peculiarly within the scope of the declaratory
judgment act. Where, however, the contract was the result of col-
lective bargaining and administrative tribunals had been created to
administer the relationships growing out of such contracts, the
problem of exhaustion of those administrative remedies as a prere-
quisite to the assumption of jurisdiction of a declaratory action
has been vividly presented. The decisions in cases of this nature
have been in sharpest conflict. Disagreement has existed where
the issue presented was one involving general rights under the
contract or where it concerned matters of internal relationship, and
whether a proceeding was pending before an administrative tribunal.
In Texoma Natural Gas Company v. Oil Workers International
UnionW4 4 a declaratory judgment suit was filed to determine the
issue of seniority rights of employees. Although no proceeding
before the National Labor Relations Board had begun, objection
1-2 See note 139 supra.
143 See note 138 supra. See also Morin v. City of Stuart, 111 F. 2d 773
(C.C.A. 5th, 1940).
14458 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. Tex. 1943), aff'd, 146 F. 2d 62 (C.C.A. 5th
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872 (1945), rehearing denied, 325 U.S. 893
(1945).
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was made to the propriety of the action of the district court in
taking jurisdiction when the administrative remedy had not been
exhausted The court maintained that the Declaratory Judgment
Act should be liberally construed, that the existence of another
remedy did not affect the court's jurisdiction under Rule 57, and,
therefore, retained the petition. Affirming this decision, the Circuit
Court of Appeals said, "An employer may e~tablish the seniority
rights of an employee . . . as well as general rights which their
contract relationship establishes, without waiting to be sued for
breach or for damages or for specific performance, and thus secure
the 'interpretation of the contract during its actual operation' and
stabilize an 'uncertain and disputed relation.' Exhaustion of the
administrative remedies . . . is not a prerequisite to the bringing
of a court action by either party for an alleged violation by the other
of a labor agreement."
Likewise, jurisdiction was accepted even where the National
Labor Relations Board had issued its directive.145 The court was
not deprived of jurisdiction over a contract reached by collective
bargaining because "The National War Labor Board is not, under
law, vested with judicial functions ... It is not a substitute for the
courts, and the pendency of a controversy before it is not a bar to
a suit in the courts." Furthermore, its directives were only advisory.
Eleven days prior to this decision the Wort hington Pump and
Machinery case,'" which is weakly distinguished in this case as
presenting "jurisdictional difficulties ... lacking here," held against
jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment on very broad policy con-
siderations. The issue was pending before the N.L.R.B. The judge
recognized that there had been cases which retained the petition
for a declaration of rights but thought that "this court should be
reluctant to allow itself to be invited into that field of controversy
unless the parties have proceeded in accordance with the national
policy that is embodied in the Norris-LaGuardia Act." He con-
tinued, "I am persuaded-that in the ordinary case, unless there has
been a complete exhaustion of administrative remedies, there ought
to be great reluctance on the part of the Federal Court to interfere
to construe a labor agreement." The policy of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was to limit injunctive interference by courts of equity and
secure administrative determination of issues more suited to such
process. Hence, it is arguable that the declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding might violate this policy.
145 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Grybas, 63 F. Supp. 414 (D. Mass.
1945), quoting Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers International Union,
Note 144 supra.
144 Worthington Pump and Machine Corp. v. Local No. 259, 63 F. Supp.
411 (D. Mass. 1945).
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Another type of problem involves internal organizational
matters, respecting which the same conflict has existed. Where an
employer was required to adopt a policy of employment which gave
preference either to the seniority provisions of the National Selec-
tive Service Act or to conflicting clauses in its union contract, and
having been threatened with suit in either event, it was held that a
declaratory judgment petition would be retained by the court. 4 '
On the other hand, where a dispute arose as to the distribution of
work between two divisions of a railroad, which precipitated a labor
controversy between groups in the same union, the court dismissed
a petition by the employees for a declaration. The reason given for
its rejection of the action was a refusal to disturb fifteen years of
collective bargaining experience between the parties involved.148
Again, where the controversy was between the employees and two
different railroads over the distribution of work at terminals, and
the employees belonged to the same union, although the District
Court retained jurisdiction of the employer's action, the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.1 49  The opinion of the
appellate court manifested an extreme reluctance on the part of
the court to enter into what it conceived of as an internal dispute
and a desire to leave such disputes to an administrative tribunal.
A similar problem has arisen in cases involving state public
utility commissions. Although Congress has denied the federal
district courts the jurisdiction to enjoin, suspend or restrain the
enforcement of orders affecting public utility rates fixed by state
commissions, it was held that the restriction was not applicable to a
petition which sought a declaratory judgment to determine the
rights of a public utility under a contract with a city to furnish
gas.150
Where declaratory actions have been brought to determine
controversies involving matters of citizenship, the courts, again, are
in conflict as to the necessity of exhaustion of the special statutory
procedure. Thus, in one case the District Court declined to make a
declaration of citizenship in a deportation case in which it was
urged that the order was unwarranted and the act unconstitu-
147Lord Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
14 Gaskill v. Roth, 151 F. 2d 366 (C.C.A. 8th 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 798 (1946), rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 876 (1946).
119 Texas & P. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 60 F. Supp.
263, (W.D. La. 1945), 63 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. La. 1945), rev'd, 159 F. 2d 822
(C.A.A. 5th 1947), cert. denied, 68 S. Ct. 62 (1947) (Decision on the merits
which followed the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the petition was
impliedly overruled by the reversal of judgment by the circuit court of
appeals on defendant's motion in the first instance.)
150 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 116 F. 2d 924
(C.C.A. 5th 1941), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 698 (1941).
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tional.151 The court required that the statutory remedy be exhausted
as a condition to jurisdiction, inasmuch as the statute itself stipu-
lated that the naturalization of aliens occur "under the conditions
prescribed in this chapter, and not otherwise.' 15 2
Yet, in a case where the Attorney General was following the
regular procedure to secure the cancellation of a duplicate certificate
of naturalization because the original court record of the naturaliza-
tion proceeding had been lost, the District Court retained the case
to give a declaration. It found jurisdiction, despite the statutory
provisions established, when one was denied the rights and privi-
leges of citizenship. 15 3 Here the exhaustion of statutory procedures
was not considered obligatory.
CONSTITUTIONALTY AND VALIDITY
There is a conflict in the cases in which declaratory judgments
have been sought prior to the exhaustion of special remedies pro-
vided by law to determine the constitutionality, validity or applica-
bility of statutes or administrative and executive orders. A case,
illustrative of the court's assumption of jurisdiction is that of Texas
Electric Railway v. Eastus 54 where an interurban railroad sought a
declaration, as against the United States Attorney and the Collec-
tor of Internal Revenue, that the Tax Act and the Railway Labor
Act were not applicable to it. The court retained the case although
such a controversy fell within the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and no proceedings had been brought before
that tribunal. Similarly, the court took jurisdiction of a proceeding
brought to declare the validity of an executive order of the Presi-
dent which directed the Secretary of War to take possession of and
operate plaintiff's plant and facilities, and to determine the rights
and status of the plaintiff company. The District Court held the
matter for its consideration despite the fact that the War Labor
Board had not been approached to determine the issue. 55
Conversely, however, an application for a declaration respecting
the validity of a tax due under the Social Security Act and an in-
15' Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290 (App. D.C. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946).
152 8 U.S.C.A. §701.
153 Brassert v. Biddle, 148 F. 2d 134 (C.C.A. 2d 1945); Ginn v. Biddle, 60
F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
15 'Note 139 supra. See also Hudson & Manhattan Ry. v. Hardy,
22 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. N.Y. 1938).
15 U.S. v. Montgomery Ward, 58 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ill. 1945), rev'd
on other grounds, 150 F. 2d 369 (C.C.A. 7th 1945); cert. denied, 324 U.S. 858
(1945), rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 888 (1945), vacated, 326 U.S. 690 (1945)
(This decision reversed prior decision because the cause was moot.)
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junction against its collection was dismissed because "the plaintiffs
have a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. ' 15o
Where no provision had been made in the statute for an appeal
from the decision of a special tribunal established therein, it was
held that the District Court could properly retain a declaratory
judgment petition. This decision was the outcome of an action
brought by a federal civil service employee charged with political
activity by the Commission which had issued an order for his
removal pursuant to Civil Service Rule and the Hatch Act, neither
of which provided for administrative or statutory review. In his
petition for a judgment declaring the invalidity of the order,
plaintiff alleged the omission of a procedure for review and the
absence of any case precedent for such review. "Under such cir-
cumstances," said the court, "we see no reason why a declaratory
judgment action, even though constitutional issues are involved,
does not lie. 15 7
Racial discrimination and interference with religious freedom
raise federal constitutional questions for the settlement of which
declaratory judgment proceedings have been brought in the federal
courts. The reasons for retaining or denying jurisdiction are not
entirely harmonious. Where a colored teacher sought a declaration
of rights against alleged discrimination in salary, as contrasted with
the wages paid white teachers, it was held that it was not a prere-
quisite to jurisdiction that the procedures set up by state law were
exhausted. The law provided for a hearing before the County
Board of Education with appeal to State Board of Education and
additional appeal to Common Pleas Court and thence to
Supreme Court. Although convenience of determination of the
state remedy did not control, the court did think that the existence
of the federal constitutional question secured jurisdiction in the
federal court and that a state, by statute, could not restrict the
court's jurisdiction. 158
Likewise, in cases where the registrar of elections refused to
register negro voters and the state law provided for appeal to the
state courts, which procedures had not been exhausted, the District
Court retained the petition for a declaration of rights. The reason
given by the courts was that the remedy established was judicial in
character rather than administrative. 9 This would seem to suggest
153Aponaug Mfg. Co. v. Fly, 17 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Miss. 1937), aff'd,
87 F. 2d 997 (C.C.A. 5th 1937).
157 United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947).
158 Thompson v. Gibbes, 60 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.S.C. 1945).
159 Hall v. Nagel, 154 F. 2d 931 (C.C.A. 5th 1946); Mitchell v. Wright,
154 F. 2d 924 (C.C.A. 5th 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946).
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that if the remedies set up by the state statutes were administrative,
an exhaustion thereof would be a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of
a district court over a declaratory action, while a remedy of a purely
judicial character would not have to be pursued.
In contrast to these race discrimination cases is one involving
religious freedom. Jehovah's Witnesses sought a declaration to the
effect that several city ordinances which prohibited certain of their
practices were unconstitutional. 11 The court refused to take juris-
diction on the ground that to do so would deprive the state courts
of their right to determine the meaning, applicability and validity.
of city ordinances subject only to review by the United States
Supreme Court. This solicitude for state authority is contrary to the
change in federal jurisdiction urged by the Thompson case, i.e., the
requirement of an exhaustion of state remedies.
The reliance upon various criteria, the existence of a federal
constitutional question, the relative convenience of adjudication at
the state level, and the necessity for exhaustion of an administrative
remedy as contrasted with judicial relief which need not be ex-
hausted, manifest some confusion in the courts on basic reasons.
The frequent desire and need of business men for an opinion
respecting the application to them of administrative regulations and
their liability for a violation thereof, has led to a federal movement
to supply such advice through the administrative agencies them-
selves. 6 ' The obvious purpose is to remove peril and risk, in fact, to
accomplish in another form what may be achieved by a declaratory
judgment. However, uncertainties have arisen respecting the effect
of this device, and the provision therefor, upon the jurisdiction of
the federal courts to give declaratory judgments where problems
exist as to the decision handed down by the agencies.
The problem has arisen first in respect to the extent of the au-
thority of the administrative agency in question and, once more,
there is some conflict in the decisions. Where the parties to a con-
tract agreed to submit certain matters to arbitration and a contro-
versy arose over the scope of the arbitration agreement, although
it was urged that the plaintiff's interests would be amply protected
by the control of arbitration growing out of the Federal Arbitration
Actt' 62 the district court held that its jurisditcion was not dis-
turbed by the fact that the arbitration device was not exhausted.16 3
It should be observed, however, that the court reiterated the fact
that eventually it would be required to decide the facts in the issue
160 Whisler v. City of West Plains, 137 F. 2d 938 (C.C.A. 8th 1943).
161 BoRcHAR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 919.
8 2 9 U.S.C.A. §§1-15, Judicial Code §274 d; 28 U.S.C.A. 400.
3.63 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Central Ry., 33 F. Supp. 362 ,(E.D.
Pa. 1940).
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and the present was as good a time as any. On the other hand, a
manufacturer who desired to ship poppy seed dyed blue in inter-
state commerce, fearing that such an act would violate the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,"4 made inquiry thereon of the Com-
missioner of Food and Drugs, as provided by law. On being told
that such action on his part would violate the law, he filed a petition
for a declaratory judgment in the District Court as to the correct-
ness of the administrator's position, which suit was dismissed.165
The court declared that mere fears did not make a controversy:
"The Supreme Court has said the pronouncements, policies and
programs of a government agency do not give rise to a justiciable
controversy, save as they have fruition in action of definite and con-
crete character .... To permit suits for declaratory judgments upon
mere informal, advisory, administrative opinions might well dis-
courage the practice of giving such opinions, with a net loss of far
greater proportions to the average citizen than any possible gain
which might accrue." No opinion is ventured on the policy argu-
ment, but it is believed that a real uncertainty perplexed the plain-
tiff and that a declaratory judgment would have served a useful
purpose. Certainly, district courts should be permitted a discretion
in such cases. A similar holding obtained in a case in which an
administrative official refused to act.'"8
Shortcomings in the adminstrative procedure, including the in-
adequacy of the administrative remedy, present another problem for
consideration. Accordingly, because the "directives of the National
War Labor Board are merely advisory," the court allowed a declara-
tory judgment even though the administrative remedy had not been
pursued. It was further pointed out that "The latter (N.L.R.B.) has
no power to create rights or determine legal liability. It can enforce
its directives only by imposing sanctions for failure to follow
'advice.' -1"7 The absence of any judicial power in the N.L.R.B. has
made the existence of administrative procedures no bar to a declara-
tory judgment when the issue required a judicial procedure. The
absence of a regular review procedure has also been held to be a
defect so serious as to justify a resort in the first instance to a de-
claratory judgment proceeding. 6,
Cases have developed in which the plaintiff denied that the
issue raised in the declaratory judgment action fell within the scope
of authority of the administrative tribunal for the jurisdiction of
164 21 U.S.C.A. 371e.
165 Helco Products Co. v. McNutt, 137 F. 2d 681 (App. D.C. 1943).
166 Cook Chocolate Co. v. Miller, 72 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1947).
187 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Grybos, note 145 supra.
168 Gordon v. Bowles, 153 F. 2d 614 (Em. App. 1946), cert. denied,
328 U.S. 858 (1946); Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers International
Union, supra note 145. (There were no "teeth" in the Board's directives.)
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which the opposing party contended. These positions are illustrated
by Sunshine Mining Company v. Carver,169 where the Wage and
Hour Division of the Labor Department urged that the plaintiff's
mining business was being conducted in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, while the plaintiff contended that his actions were
not within the act because he was not engaged in interstate com-
merce. In that case it was held that he did not have to wait indefi-
nitely to be prosecuted before the commissioner under the cloud of
the claim, but was free to seek a declaratory judgment in the
district court. Similarly, where the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
enforcement of the Renegotiation Act by the Maritime Commission
as applied to his charter parties with the British Ministry, it was
held that the issue could be determined by a declaratory judgment.
Such a judgment was considered appropriate to settle the jurisdic-
tional uncertainty, interfering in no way with the statutory ad-
ministrative plan. Rather, the court thought that a declaratory
judgment would settle the jurisdictional question in the only forum
in which it could be settled, at least at that stage of the proceedings,
ending the controversy if decided favorably to the plaintiff, and, if
decided adversely to him, it would leave the commission, and, .if
need be, the Tax Court, free to consider the merits.170 The dissent-
ing judge contended that this decision was squarely contrary to the
Helco Products Company case'' which is noted above.
Thirdly, these special statutory administrative remedies have
often presented the old question of alternative remedy. Is the de-
claratory judgment an alternative remedy respecting these? It
seems pretty clear that it is not, although there is some conflict in
the decisions. In some cases the courts have retained the petition
for a declaratory judgment regardless of the jurisdiction existing
in the several administrative agencies involved. 7 2 But where the
statutory procedure was made the exclusive remedy, a declaratory
judgment was denied.173 And a declaratory remedy was denied
also where the issue was a matter of admission to the bar of a
169 41 F. Supp. 60 (D. Idaho 1941).
170 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land, Chairman, Maritime Comm., 151 F.
2d 292, (App. D.C. 1945), rev'd, 327 U.S. 540, (1946), dismissed, 327 U.S.
765 (1946), cert. granted, 326 U.S. 709 (1945).
1'Note 165, supra.
172Adams v. N.Y.C. R.R., 121 F. 2d 808 (C.C.A. 7th 1941)
(Seniority rights adjudicated despite existing administrative remedy);
Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oil Workers International Union, supra note
145 (Exhaustion of administrative remedy not a prerequisite); Lord Mfg.
Co. v. Nemenz, supra note 147.
1' Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F. 2d 290 (App. D.C. 1946),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946) (A naturalization case); Bata Shoe
Co. v. Perkins, 33 F. Supp. 508 (D.D.C. 1940) (An alien deportation case).
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state,'74 or disbursement,'17 because the issue was considered wholly
a state matter and of such character as to leave no question for a
federal court to determine. The issues involved were federal
rights and privileges over which the state had complete control.
The decisions in this category do not present a very well de-
fined pattern. This may be because of the close bearing of the
alternative remedy doctrine which obtains very definitely in the
federal cases and also because of the discretionary element always
present in the granting of declaratory judgments.
EFFECT ON CONTINGENT INTERESTS OF DETERMINATION
OF CONTROVERSY
Courts have shown their recognition of the great ability of
the declaratory technique in the solution of cases of actual con-
troversy, by extending it to the determination of an increasing
number of factual situations which vary from the usual type of
cases. A fine illustration of this expansion in the declaratory judg-
ment procedure is found in its application to the determination of
controversies involving contingent interests. Although the courts
might seem to be treading on the dangerous ground of attempting
to solve controversies which, though "actual" are not of "immedi-
ate" concern, yet, the results are satisfactory and amply supported
by sound reason.
Where a life insurance company brought an action against
both a life and a contingent beneficiary for a judgment to declare
its liability for accidental death benefits, the court rejected the
argument of the contingent beneficiary that, because of the nature
of her interest, she should not then be called upon to defend in the
action.178 Although the court recognized some validity in her con-
tentions, it disposed of them by saying that countervailing rea-
sons pointed to a different conclusion. "To hold a person whose.
interest is contingent may not be compelled to defend an action
for a declaratory judgment would greatly diminish the field and
lessen the utility of declaratory judgment actions. The purpose of
the declaratory judgment action is to settle actual controversies
before they have ripened into violations of law or legal duty or
breach of contractual obligations." The court drew an analogy
between the interests of the contingent beneficiary in the case at
bar and the contingent claim of an injured third party in a de-
claratory action to establish non-liability under casualty insurance.
17-kStarr v. State Board of Law Examiners of Indiana, 159 F. 2d 305
(C.C.A. 7th 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 830 (1947).
175 Emmons v. Smitt, 58 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Mich. 1944).
176 Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 157 F. 2d 653 (C.C.A. 10th 1946).
See also American Machine & Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co.,
166 F. 2d 535 (C.C.A. 2d 1948).
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If allowed in the latter instance, the court could see no reason for
not granting a declaratory judgment in the case at bar. "In our
case, the interest of both beneficiaries arises out of the same con-
tract and is governed by the same occurrences. The questions of
law and fact relating to liability under the policy are common to
both. If, therefore, [the contingent beneficiary] is not a necessary
and indispensable party, she is assuredly an interested and proper
party to the declaratory action .... One of the prime purposes of
the Declaratory Judgment Act is to meet situations of this kind."
Similarly, the benefits of the act have extended protection to
the interests of the parties which are jeopardized or challenged
even before the cause of action has accruedY'7
Since the federal act makes no mention of parties, this matter
is governed by the general law 8 . However, the question of the
propriety of granting a declaratory judgment has arisen where one
of the interests involved in an action is that of a person yet unborn.
Unborn children were the contingent beneficiaries under an insur-
ance policy. An action was brought by the insured, his beneficiary,
the remainder man and contingent remainderman, to have the loan
rights under the policy declared. The court allowed the action
despite the absence of the unborn children as parties, holding such
a situation to be an exception to the rule of "indispensable
parties.' 170
CONCLUSION
In the years immediately following the passage of the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act the courts were occupied in establishing
the basic concepts and procedures under the act. They were con-
cerned with interpretations of "actual controversy," the "alterna-
tiveness" of the remedy and the status of the jury in actions brought
to secure declarations of rights. Once these principles were estab-
lished, an ever increasing number of litigants instituted suits for
declaratory judgments instead of petitioning for the traditional
forms of coercive relief. Although the act was silent on the matter,
the courts early recognized that the determination of the presence of
the prerequisites for the rendition of a declaratory judgment was a
matter of judicial discretion. It is this exercise of discretion which
accounts for the many conflicts existing in the cases today.
Because of the important part played by the discretionary ele-
ment, few significant conclusions can be drawn from a study of the
177 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hubbard, 22 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Cal.
1938).
178 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20.
170 Webster v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 50 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal.
1943), modifted on other grounds, 148 F. 2d 315 (C.C.A. 9th 1945).
1948]
256 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
cases. They do not fall into well-defined patterns. Rather, they
must be studied and analyzed individually. Even then, the extent
to which a case is authoritative in the decision of the next new,
though similar, fact situation, is not predictable. The one conclu-
sion that can be drawn, however, is that more and more courts and
litigants have recognized the advantages of this non-coercive form
of relief, and that it is readily available as a really alternative
remedy. They have proved so satisfactory in so many situations
that the occasional reluctance of a court to favor the rendition of
a declaratory judgment is surprising. If litigants are satisfied to
have their rights and duties declared without the necessity of addi-
tional coercive relief, the courts should be ready to respond.
